Impact Of Fault Current Limiters And Demand Response On Electric Utility Asset Management Programs by Behzadirafi, Shayan
University of North Dakota
UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects
1-1-2015
Impact Of Fault Current Limiters And Demand
Response On Electric Utility Asset Management
Programs
Shayan Behzadirafi
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.
Recommended Citation
Behzadirafi, Shayan, "Impact Of Fault Current Limiters And Demand Response On Electric Utility Asset Management Programs"
(2015). Theses and Dissertations. 1871.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/1871
IMPACT OF FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS AND DEMAND RESPONSE  




Shayan Behzadirafi  
Bachelor of Science, University of Tehran, 1997 




A Dissertation  
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
of the  
University of North Dakota  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
 
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 































Title                  Impact of Fault Current Limiters and Demand Response on Electric Utility Asset        
Management Programs  
Department       Electrical Engineering   
Degree              Doctor of Philosophy  
 
             In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate 
degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make 
it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly 
purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my dissertation work or, in his absence, 
by the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the School of Graduate Studies. It is 
understood that any copying or publication or other use of this dissertation or part thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which 














TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... x 
LIST OF TABLES: ............................................................................................................ xvi 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... xix 
CHAPTER 
I.INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1 
State of the Art of the Subject ..................................................................... 3 
Problem with the Existing Approach .......................................................... 4 
Contribution of this work ............................................................................ 6 
Organization of this Dissertation ................................................................ 8 
II. FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS..................................................................................... 10 
Introduction ............................................................................................... 10 
Fault Reduction Techniques ..................................................................... 11 
Comparison and Economic Considerations .............................................. 13 
Classification of Fault Current limiters (FCL’s) ....................................... 15 
Pyrotechnic fault current limiters (Is-limiter) ........................................... 15 
Current limiting reactor............................................................................. 16 
Solid State Fault Current Limiters ............................................................ 17 
Electromagnetic Dynamic Fault Current Limiter (DFCL) ....................... 18 
vi 
 
Superconducting Fault Current Limiters (SFCL) ..................................... 19 
Resistive Type SFCL’s ............................................................................. 21 
Superconductive shielded core reactor (SSCR) ........................................ 22 
Saturated iron-core type SFCL ................................................................. 23 
Matrix Fault Current Limiter .................................................................... 25 
Comparing current limiting ratio of SFCL’s ............................................ 30 
Application of SFCL in Power Systems ................................................... 32 
Using SFCL in Power Substations ............................................................ 33 
Coordination with Protection System ....................................................... 39 
III. DEPENDABILITY/SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS ........... 42 
Distance Protection Schemes and Application of Pilot Protection ........... 44 
Classification of Pilot Protection Systems ................................................ 49 
By Transmission Media Used ................................................................... 49 
By Channel Use: ....................................................................................... 49 
Event Tree Analysis .................................................................................. 57 
Internal and External Faults ...................................................................... 58 
Building Event Trees ................................................................................ 59 
Event Trees for Direct Under-reach Transfer Trip (DUTT) ..................... 61 
vii 
 
Inclusion of Noisy Channels ..................................................................... 69 
Event Tree for Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip Scheme (PUTT) .. 69 
Event Tree for Directional Comparison Blocking (DCB) ........................ 70 
Event Tree for Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB) ... 79 
Device Failure Rates and Unavailability .................................................. 94 
Impact of Protection System Structure and/or redundancies on 
Dependability/Security ............................................................................. 96 
Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip (PUTT) ........................................ 96 
Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme (DCB) ................................... 99 
Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB) ............................ 99 
Summary ................................................................................................. 103 
IV. CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS .................. 105 
Application of FCL in Sporn Substation, West Virginia ........................ 105 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis ....................................................... 108 
Study Results .......................................................................................... 110 
Application of FCL in Wind Power Plants ............................................. 120 
Simulation of SSCR ................................................................................ 121 
Simulation of Induction Generator ......................................................... 127 
viii 
 
Inclusion of SSCR in Wind Power Plants............................................... 136 
Application of SFCL in Power Substations to Enhance Reliability ....... 141 
Other Studies on Reliability Improvements ............................................ 149 
V. MODELING THE IMPACT OF OVERCURRENT ON   
RELIABILITY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT .............................................................. 158 
Modeling the Effects of Overcurrent on Component Failure Rates ....... 158 
Derivation of the model .......................................................................... 161 
Markov Model Considering Overcurrent States ..................................... 166 
Study Results Using the Markov Model ................................................. 170 
Variation of outage time with overloads. ................................................ 171 
Variation of outage time with strength deterioration. ............................. 172 
Variation of outage duration with short circuit rate. ............................... 175 
Preventive maintenance scheduling ........................................................ 177 
VI. IMPACT OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FAULT CURRENT 
LIMITERS ON ASSET MANAGEMENT ................................................................ 184 
Calculating  Impact of Protection Devices and FCL on Failure Rates ... 185 
VII. IMPACT OF DEMAND REPONSE PROGRAMS ON ASSET .............................. 204 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 204 




Demand Response Programs .................................................................. 208 
Available DR Models ............................................................................. 210 
Price Elasticity of Electrical Demand ..................................................... 211 
Models Using Elasticity of Demand ....................................................... 212 
New DR Model ....................................................................................... 213 
Modeling Demand Response including Penalties and Incentives .......... 214 
Representation of the load at each load bus. ........................................... 216 
DR Control Panel .................................................................................... 221 
Reliability Impacts of DR Programs ....................................................... 227 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE WORK ....................................... 229 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 232 









LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure                                                                                                                                         Page 
1.  Flow Chart of the work of this dissertation. ........................................................................ 9 
2.  Is-Limiter. .......................................................................................................................... 15 
3.  Resistive superconductive fault current limiters ............................................................... 21 
4.  Inductive superconductive fault current limiter. ............................................................... 23 
5.  Saturated iron-core type SFCL .......................................................................................... 24 
6.  Matrix superconductive fault current limiter .................................................................... 26 
7.  Main positions for SFCL in the power grid. ..................................................................... 33 
8. Common configurations in switching substation. ............................................................. 36 
9. Three main locations for SFCL in a substation ................................................................. 38 
10.  Single sectionalized bus arrangement: (a) before the fault (b) after the fault at “4”. ....... 40 
11.  Typical transmission line protected by distance relays. .................................................... 46 
12. General view of a pilot protection system ......................................................................... 48 
13.  Direct under-reach transfer trip protection. ....................................................................... 50 
14.  Permissive under-reach transfer trip protection. ............................................................... 51 
15.  Permissive over-reach transfer trip protection. ................................................................. 52 
16.  Directional comparison blocking protection.. ................................................................... 54 
17.  Directional comparison unblocking protection. ................................................................ 55 
18.  Classification of faults ....................................................................................................... 59 
19.  Event tree for DUTT. ........................................................................................................ 64 
xi 
 
20.  Event tree for DUTT ......................................................................................................... 68 
21.  Event Tree for DCB .......................................................................................................... 78 
22.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), external fault .......................... 80 
23.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), internal fault .......................... 82 
24.  Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ single channel (MW), external fault ................... 83 
25.  Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ single channel (MW), internal fault .................... 84 
26.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay phone line) 85 
27.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay phone line) 86 
28.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), external fault. ........ 87 
29.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), internal fault. ......... 88 
30.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), external fault. .... 89 
31.  Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), internal fault. ..... 90 
32.  Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ independent channels .......................................... 91 
33.  Event tree for DUCB redundant relay/ independent channels  ......................................... 93 
34.  Dependability/Security results for PUTT scheme. ............................................................ 98 
35.  Dependability/Security results for DCB scheme ............................................................ 101 
36.  Dependability/Security results for DCUB scheme. ........................................................ 102 
37.  Potential MFCL application ............................................................................................ 106 
38.  Load point failure rates without and with MFCL ........................................................... 113 
39.  Load point unavailability without and with MFCL ........................................................ 113 
40.  Potential instability without and with MFCL. ................................................................. 114 
xii 
 
41.  Bus isolation without and with MFCL. ........................................................................... 115 
42.  Potential T3 damage without and with MFCL. ............................................................... 116 
43.  Potential CB Blast without and with MFCL. .................................................................. 116 
44.  L1 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL ........ 117 
45. L2 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL. ....... 118 
46.  L3 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL. ....... 118 
47.  L4 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL. ....... 119 
48.  L5 Unavailability for different values of Pstab; 1: without MFCL 2: with MFCL. ....... 119 
49.  Circuit used in simulation of SSCR ................................................................................ 121 
50.  Block diagram used in simulation. .................................................................................. 123 
51.  Inside the SSCR block. ................................................................................................... 123 
52.  Output of block "s" in Figure 51. .................................................................................... 125 
53.  Limiting characteristics of SSCR: (a) experimental [51] (b) simulation . ...................... 126 
54.  Input-output status of the proposed model for SSCR. .................................................... 127 
55.  Stationary reference frame spatial diagram ..................................................................... 129 
56.  Block diagram used in the simulation of induction generator. ....................................... 135 
57.  Input- output status of the presented induction generator model. ................................... 136 
58.  Test system used in the simulation. ................................................................................. 136 
59.  Computer simulation flow graph for the circuit of Figure 58. ........................................ 137 
60.  Three-phase fault at point F ............................................................................................ 139 
61.  Single-line-to-ground fault (LG) at point F .................................................................... 140 
xiii 
 
62.  Common configurations in switching substation. ........................................................... 142 
63.  Comparison of failure rates for various arrangements with and without SFCL ............. 146 
64.  Variation of λ with respect to stuck breaker probability ................................................. 148 
65.  Six-state model of SFCL recommended in [86]. ............................................................ 150 
66.  Four-state reliability model for SFCL. ............................................................................ 153 
67.  Failure probability of circuit breaker vs. fault current magnitude. ................................. 156 
68.  Chronological diagram of normal and faulty conditions. ............................................... 160 
69.  Average profile for normal-faulty conditions ................................................................. 160 
70.  Rayleigh model of strength current. ................................................................................ 162 
71.  Growth of k with time ..................................................................................................... 163 
72.  Plot of  𝜆(𝑡) versus time for an abnormal current situation starting at 𝑡0 ...................... 165 
73.  Markov Model for preventive maintenance considering system faults. ......................... 167 
74.  Variation of outage duration with duration of the overload current values .................... 172 
75.  Variation of outage duration versus duration of the overload current. ........................... 173 
76.  Differences between two models of Figure 75 versus the overload duration. ................ 174 
77.  Variation of outage time versus short circuit rate. .......................................................... 176 
78.  Variation of outage time with maintenance rate for short circuit levels ......................... 177 
79.  Plot of 𝜆(𝑡) versus time for an abnormal current situation starting at 𝑡0 ....................... 179 
80.  Average failure rate versus overcurrent events. .............................................................. 180 
81.  Reliability in the presence of two overcurrent events. .................................................... 182 
82.  Impact of short circuits/overloads on failure rate and maintenance scheduling. ............ 183 
xiv 
 
83.  Electric Substation in the USA with SFCL installed [24]............................................... 185 
84.  Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for PUTT Scheme arrangements: 191 
85.  Increase in failure rate without FCL for various PUTT Scheme arrangements. ............. 192 
86.  Increase in failure rate in presence of resistive SFCL for various PUTT Scheme ......... 193 
87.  Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for PUTT ........................... 194 
88.  Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year ...................................................... 195 
89.  Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s ...................................................... 196 
90.  Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCB Scheme arrangements. .............. 197 
91.  Increase in failure rate with resistive SFCL for DCB Scheme ....................................... 197 
92.  Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCB ............................ 198 
93.  Increase in failure rate for three type SFCL’s and various arrangements of DCB ......... 199 
94.  Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without and with FCL .................. 200 
95.  Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for DCUB Scheme ...................... 201 
96.   Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCUB Scheme arrangements. ............ 202 
97.  Increase in failure rate with resistive SFCL for various DCUB Scheme arrangements. 202 
98.  Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCUB .......................... 203 
99.  Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without and with FCL .................. 203 
100.  Classification of DR programs. ....................................................................................... 208 
101.  Load profile for the Residential and Industrial Sectors.. ................................................ 218 
102.  Load profile for the Commercial, Large Users and Agricultural Sectors. ...................... 219 
103.  Load profile for the Government & Institution and Office & Building Sectors.. ........... 220 
xv 
 
104.  Single line diagram of the RBTS with customer compositions. ..................................... 222 
105.  DR control panel showing loads on RBTS buses. .......................................................... 224 
106.   Load profile on Bus 2. Colors codes as defined in Table 13. ......................................... 225 
107.  Load profile on Bus 3. Colors codes as defined in Table 13. ......................................... 226 
108.  Load profile on Bus 4. Colors codes as defined in Table 13. ......................................... 226 
109.  Load profile on Bus 5. Colors codes as defined in Table 13 .......................................... 227 













LIST OF TABLES  
 T able                                                                                                                                         Page 
1.  SFCL vs Conventional Solutions....................................................................................14 
2.  Comparison of Various Types of Fault Current limiters………………………….……28 
3.  Recommended locations of FCL devices in smart grids……………………………….29 
4.  Summary of Operation of the Directional Comparison Unblocking…………….……..56 
5.  List of Event Tree Illustrations for Pilot Protection Schemes……………………………60 
6.  Performance of DUTT and PUTT against Noisy Channels……………………….……70 
7.  Reliability Data for Protection Schemes……………………………………………..…96 
8.  Station Reliability Data………………………………………………………….…….144 
9.  Events Eliminated due to Employing SFCL(s) in main and transfer bus system……...145 
10.  Reliability indices for bus arrangements without SFCL…………………………......146 
11.  Reliability indices for bus arrangements with SFCL………………………………….146 
12.  RBTS Bus Load Combinations (MW)……………………………………………….224 






First and foremost, I want to thank God, whose many blessings have made me who I am 
today. After that, this doctoral dissertation would not have been possible without help and support 
from many mentors, colleagues, friends and family members over this past few years and 
throughout my entire life. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to them to 
the extent which is possible through words. 
First of all, I wish to express my sincere appreciation to my advisers Dr. Hossein Salehfar 
and Dr. Michael Mann for their support, patience and generosity. I would like to thank my 
committee members Dr. Arash Nejadpak, Dr. Prakash Ranganathan and Dr. Hassan Reza for their 
support and assistance.  I appreciate their comments, suggestions and thoughtful reviews that 
helped improve the quality of this work and add to its value in every possible ways. I also wish to 
thank Professor emeritus Dr. Arthur Miles. Every time I walked into his office, I didn’t get 
anything but his kind and welcoming words and tons of new knowledge, experience and insights. 
Also a big thank to Dave Poppke for his ideas and consistent help and also my friends that helped 
make my moments memorable and are my reasons to miss the University of North Dakota and city 
of Grand Forks. 
Also my friends in other places in the US and back home have been a continuous source 
of support and encouragement. Special thanks go to my friends: late Kamyar Nikanjam, Jalal 
Jahanshah khani, Mohammad Reza Ghane, Mohammad Hadi Varahram, Amir Hossein Partovi, 
xviii 
 
Reza Navid, Hormoz Mogarei, Khosro Khosravani, Farshid Safavi, Siby Jose, Gashu Lemma, Rex 
Sorensen, and Farah Ramezanzadeh.  
Last but not least, I would like to thank my parents, my brother and my sister. Without their 
encouragement, support and sacrifice, I would not have made it this far and could not have finished 
this dissertation. It was my mom that originally generated my love for science and learning more. 
I also want to thank my wife for her understanding, patience and support through all the ups and 
downs. Without their help, support and inspiration, I could not have completed this work. This 




















To my mom and my dad, 







Over-currents are known to be the dominant cause of power system component failures or 
deterioration from full functionality. Some of these effects may remain unknown and could later 
result in catastrophic failures of the entire or large portions of the system. There are plenty of 
devices/methods available to limit the undesirable consequences of the over-current events. These 
devices/methods have great impact on system reliability by reducing stress on power system 
components and increasing their useful lifetime.  Due to the importance of the subject, there is 
tremendous need to analyze and compare these devices/methods in terms of reliability. However, 
few researches have been reported on analyzing reliability impacts of these devices. Reported 
studies, in the meantime, appear to have investigated these effects qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively. This is mainly due to lack of a mathematical model to study the direct impacts of 
over-current values on system reliability. The main stream of reliability calculations are normally 
based on statistical measures of system outages rather than electrical parameters such as over-
current values. 
Over-currents usually appear in two common forms of fault currents and overload currents. Fault 
Current Limiters (FCL) and protection devices are commonly used to limit the impact of fault 
currents. FCL’s limit the magnitude of fault currents and protection devices limit the exposure 
time of the component to the fault current and therefore have great impact on increasing the 
lifetime of the components. Overloads, on the other hand, have smaller magnitudes than those of 
fault currents but can still be destructive because of normally much longer exposure times. 
Overcoming overload problems usually requires control strategies such as generation rescheduling 
xx 
 
and/or load shedding, and optimized usage of existing assets. Using Demand Response (DR) 
programs are one of the most effective ways of reducing overload burdens on the power system. 
In this dissertation, simulation models are developed and used to determine the effect of FCL on 
reducing the magnitude of fault currents. Various case studies will be performed to calculate the 
effectiveness of FCL’s in real power system applications. Then, security/dependability studies on 
the protection systems will be performed to analyze and calculate their effectiveness in reducing 
exposure times to fault currents. Based on the calculated indices, proper selection of protection 
schemes can be made based on the desired level of dependability/security.  
 In the next part of the work, a mathematical model is developed to calculate the effect of fault 
current magnitude and duration on the reliability and asset management. Using the developed 
model and results of the earlier sections of this research work, the impact of protection systems 
and FCL devices on reliability and asset management programs are quantitatively calculated and 
compared. The results from such studies will assist in maintenance planning and in proper selection 
of the fault current limiting devices with regards to desired reliability and asset management 
programs. 
DR programs are introduced and modeled in this dissertation as an effective tool in reducing 
overload burdens on power system components. Using the developed mathematical model, DR 
programs are studied and compared in terms of reliability improvement that they provide by 





 Power systems around the world are changing from the management and operating points 
of view and there is a strong tendency towards separating generation from the primary 
transmission grid. In this new deregulated and competitive environment, the power utility 
responsible for operating the primary grid loses control over the sitting and scheduling of 
generating units. This has the consequence that considerable attention would be devoted to 
the generation expansion in areas where previously generation deficiencies existed. 
Growth in the generation of electrical energy particularly in the form of connecting 
independent power producers (IPP’s) to the grid and an increased interconnection of the 
power grids lead to higher fault currents which have not been included in the original long 
term planning forecasts. One of the consequences of this growth is that the network and 
the associated equipment reach or even exceed their limits with respect to the over- current 
withstand capabilities. At the same time, consumers request higher level of reliability 
which can be achieved by providing parallel transmission facilities.  This will, however, 
raise the fault current level which in turn imposes a severe burden on circuit breakers and 
power system apparatuses. These problems are not avoidable due to the over-current events 
that may occur anywhere and anytime in the power network. The challenge of the future 
network designs will be to face these challenges by the application of new and effective 
technologies in the network [1] .  
Over-currents mainly appear in two common forms of short circuit and overload. Short 
circuit currents (also called fault currents) are known to be the dominant cause of power 
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system component failures or deterioration from full functionality [2] . Some of these 
effects may remain unknown and could later lead to cascading failures of the entire or large 
portions of the system. It is a common practice to use Fault Current Limiters (FCL’s) and 
protection devices to eliminate undesirable impacts of short circuit currents. They do so by 
reducing the magnitude and exposure time to fault currents.  
While short circuit can cause catastrophes by posing huge amount of stress and mechanical 
forces in a very short amount of time, overloads can also raise serious issues due to much 
longer periods of exposure. Overcoming overloads problems usually requires control 
strategies such as generation rescheduling and/or load shedding, and optimized usage of 
existing assets. Smart grids have made it a priority to address customer interactions in 
forms of Demand Response (DR) as a powerful tool to provide load/generation balance 
throughout the peak/off-peak hours, in order to reduce the overload burdens in the power 
system.  DR is defined as: "Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their 
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, 
or to incentive payments". There are several DR programs based on different price 
patterns/incentive payments designed to improve power system operation. These programs 
allow for better usage of existing assets, by reducing energy consumption during peak 
hours and increasing it in non-peak hours.   
Over-current effects are not limited to the region of exposure as they could influence the 
performance of remote equipment as well. The effects of over-currents include mechanical 
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stress, undesirable overheating, deterioration of insulation, etc. Despite the importance of 
increased over current levels on power system operation and components, few 
investigations have been reported on the evaluation of the effects of over-current on 
reliability [2]. Reported studies, in the meantime, appear to have investigated these effects 
qualitatively rather than quantitatively and suggesting a method to model them. Due to lack 
of proper models that consider the direct effect of overcurrent on failure rates, destructive 
impacts of increased over-current levels on power system reliability and the potential 
damages and resulting risk of cascading failures have been ignored. Due to their destructive 
nature, however, the recognition of these effects on component failure rates and on system 
reliability cannot and should not be underestimated. 
State of the Art of the Subject 
Current literature on reliability analysis involving FCL and protection devices are majorly 
with regard to the role of these devices in reducing outages. This is due to the fact that 
current reliability evaluation techniques (such as failure modes and effects analysis) usually 
rely on number and duration of system outages to calculate system availability indices [3].  
There are numerous studies that show the reliability improvements due to using FCL’s [4-
10]. Many studies have been carried out concerning different type of FCL’s [4], their 
structural designs [5], [6], and their impact on static and dynamic behavior of faulted 
systems [7] , [8]. In [9] , no particular substation configurations are assumed, and the FCL’s 
are located in distribution networks. [10] Has suggested a Markov model for operation of 
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fault current limiters and has calculated reliability indices based on system outages at each 
state of the Markov model. These works are all based on outage reductions that these 
devices offer. Chapter four of this dissertation shows some of the application studies and 
reliability calculations of FCL’s using existing techniques.  
There are also several works done to study reliability improvements due to protection 
systems [17-21]. [11] has studied the impact of protection system on power system 
reliability using a new method of finding cut-sets. These cut-sets are various paths that lead 
to the system partial/total outages. [12] and [13] have studied the effects of protection 
system failures on power system reliability. These failures are failure to operate when 
protection system is required to operate and malfunction when it is not required to operate. 
Again due to the nature of the existing reliability methods, these calculations are all based 
on the ability of protection system in preventing power system outages. 
In case of overloads, reliability calculations become more complicated. Since there are 
usually no immediate outages following the overload events, there are no practical ways to 
capture the reliability impact of overload currents in existing reliability evaluation 
methods. As a result, overloads are being ignored in almost all standard reliability 
calculations.  
Problem with the Existing Approach 
While outage reduction is a very important benefit of using FCL’s, and allows us to 
calculate improvements in reliability indices such as “Expected Energy Not Supplied” 
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(EENS), “Expected Load Not Supplied”, (ELNS), Capacity Outage Probability Table [14], 
etc.; it wouldn’t picture the entire story. In most cases, current limitation devices improve 
reliability without necessarily preventing outages. This becomes evident by looking at the 
works that use failure mode and effect analysis to calculate reliability indices, and seeing 
that in many cases using these devices eliminates just a few number of cases leading to 
major outages [15].  
Using an outage-based approach, gives misleading results in case of protection devices as 
well. Protection devices are usually idle during the normal operation of power systems. 
Therefore in existing models, in order to assign a meaningful reliability improvement due 
to a protection system, it must be capable of preventing major outages [16]. However, a 
major part of the system reliability due to the protection system, is in it continuously 
eliminating stress on the power system equipment regardless of having/not having major 
outages [1]. On the other hand, speed of action and the relative timing incorporated in 
various protection schemes have a profound impact on power system reliability that can’t 
be fully evaluated using outage-based approaches [17]. Therefore, existing techniques 
underestimate the reliability enhancement caused by protection systems.  
It is known that equipment that are more frequently exposed to short circuit conditions are 
more likely to fail later as a result of such stresses. In terms of reliability, the failure rate 
of these equipment will increase rapidly with time [17]. The increment in failure rate is 
obviously a function of frequency and severity of the faults. [18]  has proposed an approach 
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that considers a coefficient for failure rate reduction caused by installing FCL’s, without 
discussing the details and modeling how failure rate is actually decreased. These reliability 
impacts can not be captured using existing reliability evaluation techniques [1], [17]. 
As stated earlier, impact of overload currents on system reliability calculations are mostly 
ignored due to their less sever role in system outages. As a result, role of DR programs to 
alleviate overload conditions are not studied to their full potentials in reliability literatures.  
[19] is the only work that has addressed the impact of overloads on power system 
reliability. According to [19], overloads can combine with scheduled outages of other 
components leading to major power system outages. The truth is that the impact of overload 
currents, as suggested by [19], are less frequent compared to the actual continuous stresses 
that overloads pose on power system components on daily basis, causing a huge increase 
in their failure rates.    
Contribution of this work 
In this dissertation, the author proposes, develops, and presents an analytical method that 
models the direct impact of over currents magnitude and exposure times on the failure rate 
of power systems components. Unlike the existing reliability models that rely heavily on 
number/duration of system outages, the authors approach provides a mathematical model 
for calculating the impact of fault currents on system reliability. In case of fault currents, 
the new method enables us to directly quantify negative effects of different fault current 
values, rather than studying the system outages caused by those fault currents. Using the 
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proposed method, impacts of fault current limitation techniques on reliability improvement 
and increasing useful lifetime of power system components are calculated in this 
dissertation. Also guidelines are provided to show how to use the developed model to 
derive practical maintenance schedules for the affected components. 
There are several DR programs based on different price patterns/incentive payments 
designed to improve power system operation. These programs allow for better usage of 
existing assets by reducing the energy consumption during peak hours and increasing it in 
non-peak hours. Using the developed mathematical model introduced in above, the 
reliability impact of DR programs in reducing overload current levels are calculated and 
compared.  
Another major contribution of this dissertation is in modeling of the DR programs. Many 
models of DR programs have already been proposed by others, but they all have assumed 
a constant price elasticity [20]. This might be helpful in simplifying the problem and giving 
general results but is not acceptable for accurate studies. Another problem with constant 
elasticity models is that when the price approaches zero, it reaches a steady value while it 
should grow unlimitedly in a free market. Some other studies have modified the constant-
elasticity assumption by considering an elasticity that is constant but also changes 
depending on the spot price being considered [21]. This approach needs elasticity values 
to be recalculated for every change in the price but still has the deficiency of considering a 
linear demand function in the first place. In the current research work a new model for DR 
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programs is introduced that allows for more accurate studies of DR impacts on asset 
management, and is more consistent with real behavior of electricity price versus demand.  
Organization of this Dissertation 
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: Chapter two studies techniques that are 
widely used to reduce fault currents. Effectiveness of protection systems in reducing 
exposure times to fault currents are studied in Chapter three where security and 
dependability analysis are performed to examine and compare their performance. 
Effectiveness of FCL’s in reducing the magnitude of fault currents are studied and 
compared in Chapter four. Case studies of using FCL’s are also illustrated in this chapter 
that show several real world applications of these devices. Chapter five presents and 
develops a new analytical model to analyze the direct impact of fault current magnitudes 
and exposure times in reliability calculations. Chapter six uses this model along with results 
of the previous chapters to study the impact of FCL’s and protection systems on 
reliability/asset management. Chapter seven will study reliability improvements caused by 
using DR programs to reduce the overload burdens on power systems. Finally, conclusion 
and recommendations for future work are given in Chapter eight.  
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FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS  
 
Introduction 
 In later chapters of this work, we will model fault current limiting devices and study their 
impact on asset management. Therefore it is best to first have a basic understanding of 
these devices and their role in power system operation.   
Growth in the generation of electrical energy, particularly in the form of connecting 
independent power producers (IPP’s) to the grid, and an increased interconnection of the 
power grids would lead to higher fault currents which have not been included in the 
conventional long term planning forecasts [22]. One of the consequences of this system 
growth and the resulting high fault currents is that the network and the associated 
equipment reach or even exceed their limits with respect to the short circuit current 
withstand capabilities. At the same time, consumers request higher levels of reliability 
which can be achieved by providing parallel transmission facilities. This will, however, 
raise the fault current levels which in turn impose a severe burden on circuit breakers and 
power system apparatuses. The challenge of the future network designs will then be to face 
these challenges by utilizing new and effective technologies in the network. 
The fault current over-duty problem can be alleviated by either replacing the existing 
equipment with ones with higher fault current ratings and tolerances, or limiting the fault 
current to values that could be safely interrupted by the existing equipment.  
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Replacement of equipment could be avoided for the sake of cost savings. Reducing fault 
levels is a more practical alternative and could have a positive impact on the life of 
electrical components. Electric power system planners and operators, therefore, need new 
techniques to limit short circuit currents at different voltage levels of the existing networks. 
Fault Reduction Techniques 
Conventional solutions for limiting fault current magnitudes to interruptible levels by the 
existing circuit breakers include [23]: 
- Construction of new substations: Fault current over-duties coupled with other factors may 
result in a utility selecting this solution, which will correct the immediate problems, as well 
as providing for future growth. However, this is the most expensive and most time 
consuming of all the other solutions. 
- Bus splitting and reconfiguring: This entails separation and isolation of fault sources that 
could possibly feed a fault by opening normally closed bus ties, or by splitting the existing 
busses. This effectively reduces the number of sources that can feed a fault, but also reduces 
the number of sources that supply load currents during normal or contingency operating 
conditions. This approach in turn can reduce the reliability and security of the power system 
[14]. Splitting the buses is not desirable due to the decreased flexibility and the cost 
associated with high voltage connections [24] and [25]. 
- Multiple circuit breaker upgrades: When a fault duty problem occurs, usually more than 
one circuit breaker will be affected. Replacing or upgrading circuit breakers with ones with 
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higher ratings, has the disadvantage of not reducing available high fault currents and their 
associated hazards. This approach is also associated with the often prohibitive expense of 
replacing the switchgears within a substation. 
- Current limiting reactors and high impedance transformers: Fault current limiting reactors 
limit fault currents by the impedance across their terminals, which increases during faults. 
However, current limiting reactors also have a voltage drop under normal loading 
conditions and present a constant source of losses. They can also interact with other system 
components and cause potential instabilities. 
- Sequential breaker tripping: A sequential tripping scheme prevents circuit breakers from 
interrupting excessive fault currents at once. If a fault is detected, a breaker upstream to the 
location of the fault current is tripped first. This reduces the fault current seen by the 
breaker within the zone of protection at the location of the fault and this breaker can then 
open safely. A disadvantage of the sequential tripping scheme is that it adds a delay of one 
breaker operation before the fault is finally cleared. Also, opening the breaker upstream to 
the fault location affects protection zones that were not originally impacted by that fault 
[24]. Moreover, sequential tripping requires complex strategies that are technically very 
difficult in some cases. 
The above fault current reduction strategies, in spite of their benefits in lowering the stress 
on interrupting devices, have the main disadvantage of unnecessarily tripping other 
additional breakers and disconnects. This brings successive power outages that lower the 
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reliability of the network. It would also cause potential instabilities in the power system, 
which in some cases may contribute to major cascading failures.  
-Fault Current Limiters (FCL’s): There is a considerable interest in devices which are 
capable of limiting fault currents designated as Fault Current Limiters (FCL) [26], [27], 
[28], [29], and [30]. The FCL’s reduce fault currents to low and safe levels so that the 
existing switchgears can still protect the grid [31]. The use of FCL’s allows equipment to 
remain in service even if the fault current exceeds the peak and short-time withstand 
capabilities of the equipment. These capabilities would be the rated short-circuit and the 
breaking currents in the case of circuit breakers [25]. It follows that FCL’s would prevent 
unnecessary outages and therefore improve system reliability. 
There are many types of FCL’s [25]. These devices are basically required to provide: (1) 
rapid respond to fault currents, (2) low impedance in normal operation, and (3) large 
impedance during fault conditions [32]. The unique property of superconductor materials 
to enter a highly resistive state once the transport current exceeds a critical limit, makes 
them an ideal choice for making FCL’s [33]. Superconductive Fault Current Limiters 
(SFCL’s) are therefore receiving considerable attentions as one of the key elements of the 
future smart grids [24], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40] and [41].  
Comparison and Economic Considerations 
Table 1 summarizes the conventional solutions -for limiting fault currents to levels 
tolerable by existing breakers-, and their respective pros, cons, and relative cost. The 
14 
 
expected cost of a Superconductive Fault Current Limiter (SFCL), as a representative of 
the category of FCL devices, is also shown. Table 1 primarily considers the initial capital 
installation cost in the comparison. In the cases of multiple circuit breaker upgrades, the 
cost of bus work reinforcement must also be considered, since the level of fault current is 
not being reduced. As shown in Table 1, the SFCL is expected to be also cost-competitive 
with all of the other solutions with the exception of current limiting reactors and sequential 
breaker tripping. In these cases, a consideration of life-cycle costs and negative impacts on 
system reliability may cause a utility consider the SFCL over other solutions. 
Table 1. SFCL vs Conventional Solutions 
Solution Advantage Disadvantage Relative Expense  Relative Expense 
to SFCL 
New Substation Provides for future 
growth 
Expensive and 
lengthy to install 




Bus Splitting  Separate the sources 
of fault current 
Separate the sources 
of load current from 
load centers and 
undermines 
reliability 





Breaker Upgrades  
Most direct solution 
with no adverse side 
effects 
Difficult to schedule 
outages; bus work 
reinforcement also 
required  
High to medium, 
depending on 












Medium to low SFCL cost higher  
Sequential breaker 
tripping 
No major hardware 
installation involved  
Expands impact of 
fault to wider range 
of the system  




Classification of Fault Current limiters (FCL’s) 
Pyrotechnic fault current limiters (Is-limiter) 
The Is-Limiter consists of an extremely fast switch, which is capable of carrying a high 
rated current but incapable of limiting the fault current, and a high rupturing capacity fuse 
arranged in parallel as shown in Figure 2 [42]. The switch is connected in series with the 
main conductor and an external trigger is required to open it when a fault occurs in the 
system. When the main conductor is opened, the current start flowing through the parallel 
fuse, where it is limited within 0.5 ms and then finally interrupted at the next voltage zero 
crossing [43].  
 
 




The current flowing through the Is-Limiter is monitored by an electronic measuring and 
tripping device. At the very first rise of a fault current, this device decides whether tripping 
of the Is-Limiter is necessary. In order to reach this decision, the instantaneous current 
value and the rate of current rise through the Is-Limiter are constantly measured and 
evaluated.  
When the set points are simultaneously reached or exceeded, the Is-Limiter trips in the 
faulty phases. After operation, the limiter has to be disconnected by a series connected 
circuit-breaker in order to get access for changing the tripped Is-Limiter. The invention of 
the Is- Limiter was in 1955 and large number of them have been successfully used in DC, 
AC and particularly in three phase systems since then. Is-Limiter is claimed to be capable 
of interrupting fault currents up to 5 kA, within 1 millisecond after occurrence of the fault. 
However, it is still limited to 40 kV rated voltage levels [44]. 
Current limiting reactor 
Current Limiting reactors (CLR) are coils used to limit current during fault conditions. 
These devices are widely used for fault current limiting in medium and low voltage 
distribution systems, and is the most common and simplest type of fault current limiters. 
Such reactors have a large value of inductive reactance and low ohmic resistances.  
CLR is generally of two types: air cored type and iron cored type. For a current limiting 
reactor, it is important that the magnetic saturation at high currents does not reduce the coil 
reactance necessary to limit the fault current. Because of this, iron cores are not generally 
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used in CLRs ( [45] and [46]). Air cored reactor does not suffer from magnetic saturation 
and therefore their reactance is independent of the current. For this reason, air cored 
reactors are the one that show more desirable characteristics and are therefore most 
commonly used.  
One of the main problems associated with this device, however, is the safety problem due 
to the magnetic flux distributed through the space around CLR. Therefore, CLRs require 
proper fencing due to the personnel safety considerations. Constant voltage drops that 
would degrade the voltage profile of the system, possible resonance with other circuit 
elements of the circuit causing potential stability problems, constant energy waste, and 
distributed magnetic flux are among other important issues in regards to using CLR. [45]  
has addressed the issue of selecting and placing CLR in various substation arrangements 
to get optimized results in terms of limiting the fault effects and minimizing avoidable side 
effects.  
Solid State Fault Current Limiters 
Solid-state fault current limiters consist of semiconductor devices which are able to 
interrupt a fault current during its rise times before the peak value is reached. It is an 
advanced current interruption technology which offers a viable solution against fault 
current occurrences in the transmission and distribution systems. Recent developments in 
power switching technology have made solid state limiters suitable for voltage and power 
levels necessary for distribution system applications. In particular the progress in 
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development of Silicon Carbide (SiC) semiconductors as well as advances in Silicon (Si) 
based devices has drawn increased attention within the FCL R&D community, to the 
utilization of these techniques/materials in making FCL devices. Solid state limiters use a 
combination of inductors, capacitors and thyristors or gate turn off thyristors (GTOs) to 
achieve fault limiting functionality. 
 [47] has done a comprehensive literature review on many different types of solid state 
FCL’s. It suggests classifying the solid-state FCL topologies into three major groups: the 
series switch, the bridge, and the resonant types. Although work on solid state FCL 
indicates continuing progress in this field; however, a practical, efficient, reliable and 
economically feasible solid state device, suited to utility needs, till now, has remained 
elusive [47]. 
Electromagnetic Dynamic Fault Current Limiter (DFCL) 
DFCL is an electromagnetic FCL which automatically & instantaneously adjusts its 
impedance depending on the magnitude of the fault current, thereby maintaining the let 
through current within a narrow range of values. A DFCL operates within half a cycle (8 
milliseconds for 60Hz) to effectively protect downstream equipment and devices. 
DFCL operates at ambient temperature and provides a variable impedance proportional to 
the short circuit current, such that the more current tries to increase the more limiting action 
will be provided by the device. DFCL has a very low power consumption and a low enough 
impedance for up to normal currents, so that it does not cause a poor voltage regulation at 
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normal operating conditions. DFCL’s are self-triggered devices and automatically return 
back to their low impedance state after reduction of current to normal values. DFCL’s are 
reliable and effective current limiting solutions for the smart grid. They are called 
“dynamic” FCL’s because their impedance values vary with the current. 
An DFCL essentially works on the principle of variation of inductive reactance of a coil 
wound on a core which has a magnetic permeability proportional to the magneto motive 
force (MMF) impressed upon the magnetic circuit. Such a variable permeability leads to a 
reactance proportional to the current passing through the coil. The permeability of the 
conventional magnetic materials for various flux densities is nearly constant in the 
operating range below magnetic saturation, thus leading to nearly constant inductance and 
inductive reactance values over a range of currents. The core material used in the DFCL’s 
has radially pre-aligned magnetic domains in the inward and outward directions as 
compared to conventional cores with random domain alignment [48]. DFCL’s have a 
power rating of 9.35 MVA and are operating at customer plants since 2008 [49]. 
Superconducting Fault Current Limiters (SFCL) 
The unique property of a superconductor to passively enter a highly resistive state once the 
transport current exceeds a critical limit makes it an ideal choice for fault current limiters 
[33]. This is due to the properties that it inherits from its superconductive nature; i.e., rapid 
operation, having no resistance in the superconductivity mode but a large resistance in the 
normal mode. By using superconductor materials, Superconducting Fault Current Limiters 
20 
 
(SFCL’s) need no auxiliary circuits to detect and limit fault currents and hence they have 
a high reliability. While other types of FCL’s, such as current limiting reactors (CLR’s), 
cause a large voltage drop and power losses during non-fault conditions, SFCL’s produce 
a negligible loss during normal operation, due to their very small resistance in the 
superconductivity region. It is therefore expected that introduction of SFCL’s in electric 
power systems can result in considerable improvements with respect to power quality, 
voltage quality, and network flexibility [50]. Reviewing the literature in the area of fault 
current limiters reveals that an absolute majority of published works on FCL’s are related 
to superconductive FCL’s [26]- [30]. Studies show that SFCL provides a cost-effective 
solution that besides a good performance in limiting the fault current at the very first cycle, 
it also offers the benefit of enhancing the system reliability [22]. A SFCL performs this 
function by reducing the stress on power equipment and preventing unnecessary outages.  
Superconductors are materials that while in the super-conducting mode, have two main 
properties: 
- They pass current without ohmic losses; i.e. zero resistance, 
- They don’t allow the magnetic field pass inside them; i.e. magnetic shield. 
Superconductors lose the above properties when their critical current (or critical magnetic 
field) is surpassed and they quench into the normal state. 
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Based on the above two properties, in general there are two major types of SFCL’s –each 
type using one of the above phenomenon, designated as resistive and shielded core [37]. 
Other main types of SFCLs include saturated iron-core type SFCL and Matrix Fault 
Current Limiter. These SFCL types are introduced below.  
Resistive Type SFCL’s 
A resistive superconductor fault current limiter is directly connected in series with the 
current path to be protected.  This fault current limiter relies on the rapid change of 
resistance with temperature. The principal schematic diagram of this type of FCL is shown 
in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3. Resistive superconductive fault current limiters [22]. 
The resistive SFCL is designed such that under normal operating conditions the peak of 
the ac current flowing through the superconducting element is less than the critical current 
of the superconductor. In this situation SFCL is operating in the superconducting mode.  
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No major 𝑅𝐼2 losses or voltage drops are developed across the device in this mode.  In 
other words the SFCL is basically “invisible” to the grid. 
Under fault conditions, the current in the grid exceeds the critical current level of the 
superconductor. This surge current forces the superconductor to transit from its normal 
superconducting state to a resistive state; thereby introducing the necessary current limiting 
impedance into the grid.  In order to protect the superconductor element from thermal 
damages and to decrease its recovery time, a resistive or inductive shunt  𝑍𝑠ℎ might be 
added to dissipate some part of the fault energy.  
A cryostat holds the Superconductor resistor, 𝑅𝑆𝑐 , which is connected straight to the power 
line by current leads. This is particularly designed for a minimal heat transfer. The load 
switch  𝐿𝑆 in series is necessary to save the resistor 𝑅𝑆𝑐 from undue high power losses 
during fault conditions after tripping and allows for a sufficiently short recovery time (1- 
1.5 s). 
Superconductive shielded core reactor (SSCR) 
Another candidate for SFCL is the so-called superconductive shielded core reactor (SSCR) 
shown in Figure 4 [51]. This device uses a cylinder of bulk BSCCO-2212 or BSCCO-2223 
superconductor to separate a normal copper coil from an iron core.  In the normal operating 
mode, the field from the copper coil does not penetrate the iron core due to the shielding 
behavior of superconductor. In this case the impedance of the SFCL is limited to the small 
value of leakage inductance. Under fault conditions, however, the current induced in the 
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superconductor is sufficient to drive it to its non-superconductive state, and the magnetic 
field links the iron core. This greatly increases the impedance of the limiter, and hence 
would limit the current.  In addition, installing a "control ring" in the system to absorb some 
of the energy deposited during a fault can reduce the recovery time of the shield following 
a faulted state. The main disadvantages of this type of SFCL are its size and weight.  
 
 
Figure 4. Inductive superconductive fault current limiter [51]. 
 
 
Saturated iron-core type SFCL 
In the saturated-core SFCL’s, two iron cores (one for each half of the cycle) are saturated 
by the dc magnetic field produced by a superconducting coil wrapped around each core. 




enough (i.e. a fault) the cores are driven out of saturation and the impedance rises - limiting 
the current. 
 
Figure 5. Saturated iron-core type SFCL [46]. 
 
Figure 5 above  shows a structure diagram of single-phase magnetic saturated core type 
SFCL, which is composed of iron cores, AC windings, superconducting DC winding, DC 
power and the control circuit [46]. Under the normal operating conditions, DC 
superconducting coil generate a lot of magnetic flux which can make the iron core 
saturated. Therefore it offers very small impedance to the power system and thus has no 
adverse effects on normal transmission. 
When a short circuit fault occurs, the current 𝑖𝐿 surges, and the fault monitoring system 
will instantly cut off the DC exciting-current within a few milliseconds by means of a 
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power electronic switch, such as insulated gate bipolar transistor (IGBT) or integrated gate 
commutated thyristor (IGCT), in the DC control circuit. This will bring both of the two 
cores out of their deep saturation status. In this case, the large fault current in the two AC 
windings will produce a large inductive EMF which can limit the fault current. The 
advantage of this concept is that it does not require the superconductor to become normal 
to operate. However, it requires approximately twice as much iron (two cores). This system 
does not use the special properties a superconductive material has and theoretically it could 
be built without using superconductive conductors. In 2009, a saturated iron-core SFCL 
device was experimentally tested in small-scale distribution networks in California, United 
States [52]. In January 2010, the test field in California suffered a lightning-induced fault 
and the FCL device limited the fault current as designed. A field test in a 138 kV 
transmission network was also planned for the end of 2011 [52]. 
Matrix Fault Current Limiter  
A particular type of SFCL, called Matrix Fault Current Limiter (MFCL), has been recently 
under development by “SuperPower” Inc. and Nexans Superconductors GmbH [23]. A 
MFCL uses the same current limiting strategy as a resistive type SFCL and its schematic 





Figure 6. Matrix superconductive fault current limiter: (a) simplified model in an 





Figure 6a shows a simplified equivalent representation of the MFCL in a power system. In 
this figure, the MFCL is shown as a variable resistor in parallel with a reactor. Under 
normal operating conditions, the peak of the AC current level of the power transmission 
network is always below the critical current level of the superconductor. Therefore, there 
is essentially no voltage drop and no ohmic losses caused by the device and the device is 
“invisible” to the grid. When a fault occurs, however, fault current level exceeds the critical 
current level of the superconductor, creating a quenching condition. The superconductor is 
forced to make a transition to high resistive state and most of the fault current is shunted 
into the parallel inductor to introduce a current limiting impedance of  𝑍0 into the grid to 
limit the fault current. 
Figure 6.b shows a schematic diagram of the current-limiting matrix that includes “ m ” 
number of current-limiting modules electrically connected in series inside a MFCL. Each 
module further includes 𝑛 number of current-limiting matrix elements electrically 
connected in parallel. The current-limiting matrix is, therefore, an 𝑚 × 𝑛 matrix. Each 
current-limiting matrix element includes a parallel electrical arrangement of a 
superconductor 𝑅 and an inductor  𝐿 .  
The parallel-connected inductors in the current limiting matrices act as shunts. The partial 
divergence of the surge current to the inductors, serves to reduce the 𝑅𝐼2 heating of the 
superconductors during the current limiting phase of the MFCL operation. This allows for 
a fast recovery of the MFCL device to its superconducting state. Also, if a superconductor 
28 
 
element fails for any reason, the parallel connected inductor can continue to carry the load 
current, although a very small voltage drop will appear across the device [51]. 
Table 2 gives a comparison between current-limiting related features of various types of 
FCL’s [46].   
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It is shown in [55] and [56] that it is sufficient to limit fault currents with an activation time 
less than of a quarter cycle. So all of these FCL devices satisfy current limiting requirement 
in speed [57]. High limiting ratio of resistive SFCL’s will make them attractive choices in 
areas with high fault duty problems. Immediate response of inductive type SFCL’s, on the 
other hand, will minimize the exposure time to fault currents and hence will enhance many 
operational aspects of the power system including the transient stability and security.  
Table 3 shows the recommended locations for some major type FCl’s mentioned in Table 
2 [57]. Based on Tables 2 and 3, it is concluded that SFCL’s are the only suitable devices 








Table 3. Recommended locations of FCL devices in smart grids [57] 
FCL Location in 
Smart Grid 
Resistive SFCL Saturated Iron 
Core SFCSL 








No No Yes No 
Distribution 
Substation 
Yes Yes No Yes 
Transmission 
Substation 
Yes Yes No No 
 
Comparing current limiting ratio of SFCL’s 
In later chapters of this dissertation, impact of fault current limiting devices on asset 
management are studied. Of specific importance is the performance of these devices in 
limiting fault currents, which is found to be the key element in determining how efficient 
they are in improving asset management and maintenance programs. 
There are a number of literatures available that have performed quantitative and 
comparative analyses on current limiting behavior of the SFCL’s. [58] has studied the 
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impact of design parameters, and in particular the turn’s ratio, of the inductive type SFCL 
in limiting the fault currents and also reducing the power burden of the superconductive 
element. [58] has also shown that the performance of SFCL’s can vary depending on the 
fault type on the power system. We will use some of the results presented in [58] in our 
quantitative analysis of the impacts of SFCL’s. [59] has considered and compared various 
application locations of SFCL’s and has shown that the performance of these devices in 
limiting fault currents can vary based on their installation locations in the power system.  
In [41], the effect of various fault types on limiting capability of SFCL’s is studied and 
concludes that these devices can limit different fault types with different limiting ratios. It 
is shown that e.g. in case of a single line-to-ground fault, the fault current is effectively 
limited because the superconducting elements of the healthy phases and the reactors shared 
the burden of the fault. In case of a double line-to-ground fault, the burden of the 
superconducting elements was reduced because the power burden of the fault phases was 
shared by the remaining healthy phase, but the fault current limiting rate was lower than 
that of a single line-to-ground fault. The fault current limiting rate of the triple line-to-
ground fault was similar to that of the double line-to-ground fault. 
Studies in  [60] and  [61]  show that better results in improving transient stability and 
security of the power system would be obtained by using resistive SFCL’s compared to 
inductive SFCL’s. [34] and [62] show that the resistive-SFCL displays greater resistance 
than inductive-SFCL. This greater resistance makes the resistive-SFCL more effective than 
inductive-SFCL for fault current limitation. Also the temperature of the superconductive 
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material of the resistive-SFCL is greater than that of the inductive-SFCL. This makes the 
operation of inductive-SFCL safer in comparison with the resistive-SFCL, and allow it to 
afford successive faults [34]. Finally, the optimal combination between SFCL design, type 
and location in power system would guarantee the best usage of this device in electric 
networks of the future. 
Application of SFCL in Power Systems 
Application of SFCL’s is a viable approach to reduce the fault current. Under normal 
operating conditions, a SFCL retains low impedance values so that the power flow is 
unobstructed. In the event of a fault, however, the impedance of the SFCL rapidly 
increases. Figure 7 illustrates three major configurations appropriate for SFCL installation 
[63]. SFCL at the main position, A, can help reduce fault currents, prevent transformer 
damage, and alleviate voltage dips on the upstream high-voltage bus during faults on the 
medium-voltage bus. Thus, a larger, low impedance transformer can be used to maintain 
voltage regulation at higher power level and meet increased demand on a bus without 
circuit breaker upgrades. SFCL installed at bus tie position, B, in the event of a fault can 
help maintain the voltage level on the un-faulted bus. Smaller and less expensive SFCL’s 
can be installed in the feeder position, C, to provide protection of old and/or overstressed 






Figure 7. Main positions for SFCL in the power grid. 
 
Diverse studies have been carried out on SFCL application in power systems to solve 
different issues due to fault current and other issues in the system. [64]  and  [24]  introduce 
the various applications of the SFCL’s in the transmission and distribution networks.  
Using SFCL in Power Substations 
As noted above, potential locations of SFCL’s in the power system include interconnection 
of MV bus-bar, grid integration of distributed generation and power substations [64], [35] 
and [65]. The fast response of SFCL’s and their higher voltage and current ratings would 
make them ideal choices for application in transmission and distribution level substations 
[57] , [46] and [36].  In next chapters of this document, application of SFCL’s in 
transmission substations, including application of an SFCL in the electric transmission 
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network in the USA will be studied in more details and will show that using SFCL would 
improve the reliability and security measures of the load points and of the larger power 
system..  [66] proposes a smart sub-transmission level fault current mitigation solution 
using SFCL’s and substation automation system for managing fault current issues in 
regions with high fault current levels. Application of SFCL’s in substations has been 
studied in [36] and it is shown that SFCL’s can effectively reduce the fault duty levels to 
those controllable by existing switchgears and protective devices. [22] studies application 
of SFCL’s in a substation in North America and evaluates and compares the reliability 
indices with and without the SFCL, and concludes that SFCL plays an important role in 
improving the reliability and security indices of the substation and the entire power system.  
A large number of possible substation configurations exist. The most commonly used ones 
are: single sectionalized bus arrangement, main and transfer bus system, breaker and a half 
and double bus systems [67]. These configurations are shown in Figure 8.  
Single sectionalized bus arrangement. 
All connections terminate on a common bus. This configuration is low in cost.  However, 
all components connected to a single bus should be de-energized for the bus maintenance 





(a) Single sectionalized bus arrangement 
 




(c) Main and transfer bus system 
 
(d) Double bus system 
Figure 8. Common configurations in switching substation. 
 
Breaker and a half. 
This configuration is made of legs consisting of three series breakers connected between 
two buses. Since two circuits are connected on each leg, 1.5 breakers are required for every 
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circuit. This configuration has a high degree of flexibility and reliability. Repair or 
maintenance could be performed on each breaker without disconnecting any circuit. 
Main and transfer bus system. 
A transfer bus is connected to a main bus through a tie breaker.  All circuits are normally 
connected to the main bus, but they can be transferred to the other bus using sectionalizing 
switches. In this configuration, each breaker could be repaired without any circuit being 
interrupted. In this case the coupling switch between buses would temporarily replace the 
switch being repaired.  
Double bus system. 
In this system, a single breaker is used per circuit and that could be connected to either bus 
via disconnect switches. A tie breaker between buses allows circuits to be transferred 
without disconnecting them. 
SFCL can be installed at three main locations in switching substations as shown in Figure 
9.  These locations include: feeder breaker position, main breaker position and bus-tie 
breaker position. In the feeder breaker position, SFCL protects the feeder and all 
downstream equipment. In this case, feeder equipment are either highly valuable or 
difficult and costly to replace. Underground cables are good examples of this type of 
equipment. Allocation of SFCL in the feeder breaker position has an advantage of requiring 




Figure 9.Three main locations for SFCL in a substation: (a) feeder breaker SFCL (b) 
main breaker SFCL (c) bus-tie breaker SFCL. 
A SFCL in the main breaker position protects the main feeder and all bus-connected 
feeders.  In this case, however, a separate SFCL is required for each individual incoming 
feeder. 
A bus-tie SFCL allows two buses to be tied together without significantly raising fault 
current on either bus [38]. 
In the feeder breaker position, SFCL only limits the fault current passing through that 
feeder and therefore the worth of SFCL would only be equivalent to the cost of upgrading 
one feeder breaker.  The worth of installing SFCL in the main breaker position is higher as 
the SFCL limits all fault currents coming from the main breaker and falling into outgoing 
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feeders. So the SFCL value in this location is limited to the avoided cost of upgrading the 
breakers connected to one bus. The bus-tie SFCL would eliminate the need to upgrade all 
the substation breakers. Given the limiting requirements of utilities and the avoided 
substation upgrading costs, installing SFCL in the bus-tie location represents an effective 
and cost saving application of SFCL [38] . 
As it can be seen from Figure 9, SFCL has to continuously carry the full load current in the 
first two positions. Therefore, the bus-tie position SFCL appears to be the most economical 
option among other alternatives because it would have the lowest losses under normal 
operating conditions [68].   
Coordination with Protection System  
In order to provide sufficient current to the protective devices, SFCL should not limit the 
current to a level that would be below the operating current of the relays. This, however, 
does not apply when a SFCL is used at the bus-tie position [25].  In a bus-tie location, 
SFCL could reduce the fault current to the steady state level or even lower. Therefore, in 
the bus-tie location, the protective relaying is required to be able to detect the fault even 
though the fault current is reduced to the normal value or less. Below is an example of this 
situation. 
Consider the circuit shown in Figure 10 (a) that shows a simple arrangement called “single 
sectionalized bus arrangement”.  If an active failure (short circuit) occurs at breaker 4, fault 
currents will flow in the directions shown in Figure 10 (b).  Current “I2” is the actual short 
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circuit current while “I1” has been limited by the SFCL. If the SFCL didn’t exist, in case 
of a fault at breaker 4, the protective devices –which are usually differential relays- would 
detect the fault and open breakers 1 and 2 simultaneously.  With SFCL in the circuit, 
although the current has been limited, it is still required to detect the fault and isolate it at 
the earliest possible. Therefore, breaker 2 opens as a result of large short circuit current. 
Breaker 1, however, doesn’t open and continues to send the normal current to load L1 until 
the fault is detected and the “load interruptible disconnector” (LID) no. 4a interrupts the 










Application of SFCL in these arrangements and locations and their impacts on asset 


















DEPENDABILITY/SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
Another important class of devices that limit the impact of fault currents on power 
equipment and on the power system in general, are protection devices. Protection systems 
are inseparable parts of power systems and are responsible for protecting valuable assets 
and improving reliability and security of the power system. Protection systems perform 
this by acting on time in limiting the spread of fault current to the healthy parts of the 
system [69]. The degree of protection and assurance that these systems provide against 
fault currents, is therefore dependent on how much “on-time” or how fast they can act in 
detecting and clearing the faults in real time. This depends on factors such as design, relay 
structure, and the protection scheme that is in place.  
 In this chapter we perform security and dependability analysis of protection systems. We 
need the results of this analysis to be able to find the expected clearance time of various 
protection systems. We will then use the expected clearance time along with the theory 
developed in chapter five to determine impact of various protection systems on asset 
management.    
Reliability of protection systems includes two major areas of security and dependability 
[70] and [71]. Security is the degree of certainty that protection systems will not operate 
incorrectly when they should not operate, while dependability is the degree of certainty 
that protection systems will operate correctly when they should operate [71]. 
In each moment of time, a protection system can reside in one of the following states: 
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S   Protection succeeds in clearing internal faults (instantaneous) 
F   Protection fails in clearing internal faults (protection not healthy while needed 
to operate) 
SB  Protection operated correctly to block over-tripping during external faults. 
(Does not operate when it is not required) 
MF  Malfunction (protection operated incorrectly) 
SN  Protection is healthy but not required to operate 
FN  Protection is not healthy while not required to operate 
SD  Protection succeeds in clearing fault but after a time delay (clearing is not 
instantaneous) 
During an internal fault (fault in the zone of protection that should be cleared by the 
protection system), protection system can be in one of the states: 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷. If  𝑇𝑆 , 𝑇𝐹 , 
and  𝑇𝑆𝐷  are clearing times associated with these states respectively, then the expected 
clearing time for the protection system would be: 
𝛿 = 𝑃(𝑆). 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑃(𝐹). 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑃(𝑆𝐷). 𝑇𝑆𝐷                                                                             (1) 
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Where 𝑃(𝑆), 𝑃(𝐹), and 𝑃(𝑆𝐷) are probabilities of being in states 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷, respectively. 
To find the value of these probabilities, performing security and dependability analysis is 
necessary. 
To do this as a general practice, we focus our study on one of the most widely used types 
of protection systems known as the pilot distance protection scheme [72]. 
Distance Protection Schemes and Application of Pilot Protection  
The distance protection method is the most used techniques for preventing damages that 
can be inflicted on transmission lines [72]. In recent decades, selectivity issues have raised 
the demand for introducing a means of communication and therefore the so called “pilot 
protection” into the regular distance protection schemes.  
Selectivity in protection refers to the ability of protection system to isolate the faulty 
component without affecting non-faulty parts of the power system [73]. Usually each major 
component in power system is provided with its own protection system and their timing is 
set in a way that selectivity is ensured. If the protection system responsible for the isolation 
of the faulty component does not operate, a so called “back up” system will operate and 
will usually isolate a bigger part of the system. Therefore, tripping time of the backup 
system must be longer than that of the main system so that it can wait, and interferes only 
after the main system failed to operate in the designated time.  
In transmission networks, selectivity issue is much more complicated due to the large 
number of equipment involved and their dispersed locations. In such systems, security calls 
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for employing a relatively large number of protection devices and arranging them so that 
sufficient time grading is allowed between tripping characteristics. As a result of this time 
grading, considerable time delays would be allotted to the remote end devices. In many 
applications such as EHV systems where lines carry large power transfers, delayed tripping 
of faults may cause drastic network stability problems.  
To avoid the unnecessary time delays when instantaneous fault clearance is intended, pilot 
protection systems have been proposed. There are a number of pilot protection schemes 
available [69]. The most important ones are discussed in the following parts of the paper. 
These schemes differ widely in the degree of reliability they offer. A quantitative analysis 
should therefore be performed to determine the security and dependability of each scheme 
and to shed light on the subject of selecting the appropriate design with respect to the 
required level of the reliability.  
In this chapter, first pilot protection systems are introduced and various types of these 
systems are discussed. Pilot protection systems generally include: DUTT1, PUTT2, POTT3, 
DCB4 and DCUB5. 
                                                 
1 Direct Under-reach Transfer Trip 
2 Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip 
3 Permissive Over-reach Transfer Trip 
4 Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme 
5 Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme 
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Distance protection is an accredited form of protection for transmission systems 
particularly when the line terminals are relatively far apart. In a typical power transmission 
line, such as the one shown in Figure 11, this is usually done by using the distance relays 




















Figure 11. Typical transmission line protected by distance relays. 
 
Assume that a fault occurs at the left end of the line close to relay “S”. Relay “S” recognizes 
the fault as a zone 1 fault and trips the circuit breaker instantaneously. The relay at the 
other end of the line detects the fault as a zone 2 fault. It is, however, not able to determine 
if the fault near the left side bus is on one side or the other side of that bus. This will cause 
a timer at relay “R” to be started, which will result in delayed tripping. In many 
applications, this time delay is not acceptable. Adding a pilot channel from the left end to 
the right end of the line could be considered as a means of eliminating the time delay. The 
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pilot signal generated at relay “S” informs the right-end relay “R” that the fault is on the 
protected line, thereby tripping should be initiated without delay.  
There are several advantages in high-speed simultaneous tripping of all line terminals for 
all internal faults [2]. Some of these advantages are as follows: 
- Reduced possibility of line damage 
- Improved power system transient stability  
- Allowance for high speed tripping, which if successful, improves transient stability, 
minimizes the outage time, and improves voltage conditions. 
Unit protection schemes compare the conditions at the two ends of the protected feeder 
simultaneously. These schemes can positively identify whether the fault is internal or 
external and are capable of providing high-speed protection for the whole feeder length. 
However, unit protection schemes don’t provide backup protection to adjacent feeders as 
given by distance protection schemes. The most desirable scheme is the one that combines 
the features associated with both arrangements, i.e. instantaneous tripping for the whole 
feeder length plus back up protection to adjacent feeders. This can be achieved by 
interconnecting the distance protections at each end of the protected line by a signaling 














Figure 12. General view of a pilot protection system [69]. 
Traditional communication channels used for pilot protection include pilot wires, power 
line carrier (PLC), and microwaves. The latter two channels are still widely used by 
utilities. 
Fiber optics emerged in the early 1980s as a new type of communication means for pilot 
protection [74]. Fiber optic channels have broad bandwidths and eliminate electrical 
induction, noise, and electrical insulation problems of pilot wire channels.  
The voltages and currents at each end of the transmission line are monitored by the local 
relay equipment where trip signals maybe generated and sent to the local circuit breakers. 
In addition, the local relay sends a signal (either a logic information or phase or current 
information depending on the scheme of protection) to the relay equipment at the remote 
end of the line through the communication equipment and channel. This provides each 
relay location with important new information regarding the need for tripping [69]. 
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Classification of Pilot Protection Systems  
Pilot protection systems can be classified according to the transmission media or the 
channel usage [69].  
By Transmission Media Used 
The media used for the transmission of protection signals are: power line carrier (PLC), 
microwave, fiber optics, and telephone leased lines. 
The choice of utilizing the pilot signals depends on several factors, such as the availability 
of fiber optic or microwave paths, cost, reliability, and type of the relay scheme. 
In power system protection communications, the signaling applications have traditionally 
been analog transmission in any of these media, although digital systems are predominating 
as they are becoming available with reasonable costs.    
By Channel Use: 
In terms of channel use, pilot systems can be either transfer trip or blocking systems.  
Transfer trip systems. 
In the transfer trip systems, a channel signal must be transmitted and received before 
tripping occurs at internal faults. No channel signal is required for external faults. Transfer 
trip systems differ in the principle they use for sending the trip signals. The most important 




Direct under-reach transfer trip scheme (DUTT) [75]. 
The DUTT scheme uses an instantaneous zone 1 element to trip the local circuit breaker 
and initiate a transfer trip to the remote end. Once the transfer trip signal is received, the 
remote end trips immediately without any additional verification. The basic logic circuit is 
shown in Figures 13.b and c. This scheme is extremely simple but is susceptible to 
undesired tripping if channel noise keys the direct trip signal. This is why it is rarely used. 
This risk can be minimized by using a dual-channel transfer trip, which requires the receipt 
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Permissive under-reach transfer trip scheme (PUTT) [75]. 
The DUTT scheme can be modified to be more secure by supervising the received signal 
with the instantaneous zone 2 operations before permitting a trip, as shown in Figure 14. 
This modified scheme; i.e. PUTT, uses zone 1 to trip the local breaker and sends a 
permissive trip signal to the remote end. The remote end breaker trips when it receives the 
permissive signal, if its zone 2 element detects a fault. As it uses the zone 2 element to 
supervise tripping on receipt of the permissive signal, unlike DUTT, this scheme is less 
susceptible to mal-operation under noisy channel conditions. Because the scheme uses an 
under-reaching element to send permission, PUTT doesn’t send a permissive signal for 
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Permissive Over-reach Transfer Trip Scheme (POTT) [75] : 
POTT schemes use an over-reaching zone 2 element to send a permissive trip signal to the 
remote end. The remote end breaker trips when it receives the permissive signal, if its zone 
2 element is detecting a fault as well. Figure 15 illustrates the POTT scheme.  
If distance relays with mho characteristics are used, the scheme is better suited than the 
PUTT for protecting short lines. The reason for this is that the resistive coverage of the 
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Figure 15. Permissive over-reach transfer trip protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) Pilot 






In the blocking systems, the channel is only used to prevent tripping of the remote circuit 
breakers on external faults. The channel signal is not required for internal faults; i.e. 
tripping occurs in the absence of a channel signal.  
Directional comparison blocking scheme (DCB) [75]. 
Unlike the above schemes, in which a signal is sent when a fault is detected in the forward 
direction, DCB scheme sends a signal (block trip) when a fault is detected in the reverse 
direction. If the local relay detects a reverse fault (using zone 3), it sends a block trip signal 
to the remote end. At the remote end, the over-reaching zone 2 elements are allowed to 
trip, following a short coordinating time delay (shown in Figure 16 as T), if they are not 
blocked by the arrival of the block trip signal. In practice, zone 3 units are set with a forward 
offset characteristic to provide back-up protection for bus-bar faults after zone 3 time delay. 
This makes it necessary to stop the blocking signal being sent for internal faults. This is 
achieved by making the signal sending circuit conditional upon non-operation of the 
forward looking zone 2 unit, as shown in Figure 16.   
The on-off power line carrier is the channel which is almost always used with DCB scheme. 
Since the communication channel is not required for tripping, internal faults that might 
short and interrupt the channel (in case of PLC) are not a problem. Over-tripping will 
occurs, however, if the channel or local relay equipment fail to operate for external faults 
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within the reach of the trip fault detectors. Since the carrier transmitter is normally off (non-
transmitting state), channel failure can’t be detected until the system is tested or an external 







Figure 16. Directional comparison blocking protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) Pilot 
protection logic [75]. 
Directional comparison unblocking scheme (DCUB) [75]. 
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Figure 17. Directional comparison unblocking protection. (a) Zones of protection (b) 
logic circuit. 
Normally, a block frequency is transmitted and OR-1 has no output. Therefore, both AND-
1 and AND-2 are unsatisfied, which means that OR-2 has no output. The block frequency 
is removed for an internal fault, which means that OR-2 will be satisfied whether the 
unblock signal is operable or not. This is important as it is possible that the unblock signal 
is shorted out by the fault. When this occurs, OR-1 gives an input to AND-2 which satisfies 
this gate for 150ms. Then AND-2 picks up OR-2 to provide an input to AND-3. Without 
this unblock signal, 150ms is provided for tripping. After 150ms, lockout is initiated since 
one of the inputs to AND-2 is removed. This removes the input to AND-3.  
If the unblock signal is received, this results in an input to OR-2 to directly provide input 























stop the timer. Table 4 describes the operation of the DCUB, associated with faults (1) and 
(2) shown in Figure 17(a). 
Table 4. Summary of Operation of the Directional Comparison Unblocking 
Type of fault Events at station S Events at station R 
(1) Internal 
Zone 2S operates. f1 
channel shifts to unblock. 
Loss of block and/ or 
receipt of unblock (f2) 
inputs to AND-3. Trip. 
Zone 2R operates. f2 
channel shifts to unblock. 
Loss of block and/or receipt 
of unblock (f1) inputs to 
AND-3. Trip. 
(2) External 
Zone 2S operates. f1 
channel shifts from block 
to unblock. F2 channel 
continues to block. No 
trip. 
Zone 2R does not see fault. 
Loss of block and/or receipt 
of unblock (f1) inputs to 
AND-3. No trip. 
 
In this work in order to compare the impact of adding redundancy to specific parts of the 
pilot protection system as well as using different media for communication, the following 
configurations have been considered and studied for each pilot scheme  
 Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel 
 Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
 Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic) 
 Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic) 
 Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW) 
 Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
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Event Tree Analysis  
The event tree development process determines the boundaries of the particular analysis 
by defining the initiating event and the possible outcomes for each sequence of events.  The 
event tree analysis defines possible scenarios including success, and partial and/or 
complete system/subsystem failure.  Because of this, event tree analysis is a preferred 
method in studying complex systems and those whose response and consequences are not 
quite obvious and need a more in-depth cause and effect analysis. Other similar techniques 
such as fault trees are often used to quantify system events that are part of event tree 
sequences [3]. 
An event tree is a pictorial representation of all events which can occur in a system. It is 
defined as a tree because the pictorial representation gradually fans out like the branches 
of a tree as an increasing number of events are considered. Beginning with an initiating 
event; the event tree details a sequence of pivotal events that lead to specific end states 
(e.g. OK, Partial Failure or Failure).  
In a protection system, event tree is typically started with a particular event – e.g. 
occurrence of a fault- and continues in each step by considering the operation or failure of 
the elements in that stage. This procedure is continued until it reaches the system success, 
failure, or any other modes of interest. In this way, a pictorial diagram of the system 
behavior is built up.   
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Here, the term “protection system success” is defined as “the ability of protection system 
to clear the fault in a prescribed time”; any deviation from this definition is not regarded as 
a system success. A list of abbreviations used in the event tree diagrams and a short 
definition of each term are given in the beginning of this chapter. 
It should be noted that in order to calculate reliability indices from the event tree diagrams, 
failure rate and unavailability of various elements of the system should be known. In this 
chapter, after drawing the event tree diagrams, failure mechanisms of the protection system 
are studied. 
Internal and External Faults 
It is useful to note that, from the protection viewpoint, not all internal faults are the same 
within the zone of the protected line. There are two major areas to be considered throughout 
the line as shown in Figure 18. These areas include the two end zones of the line and the 
overlapping zone. The overlapping zone area is within the zone 1 reach of both relays. 
However, the end zones are detected as zone 1 by the nearby relay and as zone 2 by the 
remote relay. Different reaction is expected from the protection scheme in clearing the fault 





Figure 18. Classification of faults: F1&F2-External faults, F3&F4-internal end-zone 
faults, F5-internal overlapping-zone fault. 
However, the above bordering rule is not completely rigid. The reason is that the accurate 
impedance of the line may not be available in each zone reach. In practice, faults near the 
borders of these areas could result in malfunction of the protection system. More accurate 
analysis is required in order to take these errors into account. 
Building Event Trees 
The inherent advantage of the event tree is its capability to investigate the attitude of the 
protection scheme when a fault occurs in the system. Since the philosophy of protection is 
different in case of internal and external faults, it is necessary to distinguish these two faults 
when building the event trees. 
With respect to the above points, an event tree analysis has been performed for each pilot 
scheme discussed earlier and results are shown in Figures 18 to 20 as referring to the list 







End zone End zone
F1 F3 F5 F4 F2
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Fig.19.a Fig.19.c Fig.19.e Fig.19.g Fig.20.a Fig.20.c 
Internal 
fault 




Fig.21.a Fig.21.c Fig.21.e Fig.21.g Fig.21.i Fig.21.k 
Internal 
fault 




Fig.22 Fig.24 Fig.26 Fig.28 Fig.30 Fig.32 
Internal 
fault 
Fig.23 Fig.25 Fig.27 Fig.29 Fig.31 Fig.33 
 
The referred configurations in above table are as follows:  
   config. 1:  Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel 
   config. 2:  Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW) 
   config. 3:  Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
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   config. 4:  Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic) 
   config. 5:  Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic) 
   config. 6:  Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
Event Trees for Direct Under-reach Transfer Trip (DUTT) 
The event tree for this scheme is shown in Figures 19 a to h and 20 a to d. 
The diagrams consist of individual events representing the failure or success of each 
component in the system. Failure rates and probabilities associated with these events will 
be introduced in the next part of the chapter.  
It can be seen from these figures that for external faults failure of any component within 
the protection system would result in mode “FN” in case of an external fault. If all elements 
are healthy, though, the protection is healthy but yet not required to operate (SN). Please 
refer to beginning of this chapter for a complete list of protection system modes used in the 
figures.  
In Figure 19.e, DUTT single relay/ redundant channels (MW+ relay to relay phone line), 
if any component of the MW channel- say tone equipment at “S” side- is faulty, the fault 
tree reaches to the point “A” in the fault tree diagram, where checks the second media 
channel (phone line here) for health and again results in “FN” if the auxiliary channel is 
faulty as well.  
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Figure 19.b1 illustrates the concept of redundancy in protective relays and can be described 
as follows: If the primary protection at “S” fails due to the hardware failure or relay being 
misapplied, the event tree reaches to point “B”. At this point, the backup protection is 
examined for health. If the protection at “S” (primary or backup) is neither hardware-faulty 
nor misapplied, the event tree continues to point “D” indicating that protection at “S” is 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 19. Event tree for DUTT. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 20.c illustrates the situation where redundant relays and independent channels 
(MW+ relay to relay phone line) are applied. In this case, if the relay on channel 1 is faulty 
at “S”, the event tree reaches point “A” where the second channel relay is examined for 
being healthy. Should the channel 2 relay work, the event tree continues in the bottom 
branch or else the system stops in “FN” mode. In the bottom path, only channel 2 relay is 
healthy and hence the event tree continues regardless of status of channel 1 relay in station 
“R”. If in channel 2 of station “R”, both relay and communication are healthy, the entire 
system is healthy while not required to operate (SN); otherwise, it results in “FN”. Point 
“B” is where the channel 1 relay is healthy and channel 2 relay fails and continues on the 
middle branch with examining only channel 1 at station “R”.  
The top path continues when both channel 1 and channel 2 relays at “S” station are healthy. 
In this case, if channel 1 relay at “R” fails, only channel 2 remains healthy and the event 
tree reaches point “C” to examine channel 2 media, i.e. microwave. Similarly, event tree 
reaches “D” when channel 2 relay at “R” fails leaving only channel 1 healthy. Moreover, 
if both channel relays at “R” are healthy, the system could work through either channel, 
i.e., if one media fails it goes straight to the other one. This concept is represented by point 
“E” in the event tree. 
Figure 19.b states that any error in the protection system at “R” or “S” would result in “F” 
mode. Defects in the communication, however, stop the permissive protection and the fault 
is cleared with time delay of zone “2” that is denoted with “SD”.  If the internal fault is in 
the overlapping zone as defined in Figure 19, instantaneous zone 1 elements of both relays 
directly clear the fault and the pilot media is bypassed (Figure 19.b second diagram).  
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In the next configurations, redundancy is added in terms of extra relays and/or channels 
and the same ideas are applied as above.  
Note that in all cases, successful clearing of internal faults within the end zones requires 
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Figure 20. Event tree for DUTT. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 


































































































































































































































































































































Inclusion of Noisy Channels 
In above calculations the impact of noisy channels was not considered. More accurate 
investigation could be performed by adding noise to the channel. Communication path is 
usually long and may be vulnerable to erroneous excitation by storms, mutual induction, 
or other means. 
The impact of noise can be considered only on microwave channel due to its exposure to 
outdoor conditions. Moreover, it is often sufficient to study the effects of noise on the 
DUTT scheme since the other pilot schemes are made robust to the noisy channels by using 
the supervisory system that checks the validity of the received signal. 
The overall reliability index of a protection scheme can be calculated using the concept of 
expectations as bellow: 
             noisewithoutindexchannel noisyP





                        (2) 
Where channel)noisyP  ( is the probability that the communication channel is noisy.  
Event Tree for Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip Scheme (PUTT) 
As noted earlier the principle of protection is the same for DUTT and PUTT schemes in 
terms of using communication channels for various areas of protection. The main 
difference is that PUTT has been made secure to the channel noises using a supervising 
function. Therefore, the event tree diagrams for PUTT are the same as those of DUTT 
shown in Figures 19.a to 19.f. However, with an exception that in case of DUTT channel 
noises should be taken into account using Equation (1). This difference between DUTT 
and PUTT schemes are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Performance of DUTT and PUTT against Noisy Channels 
Type of fault 
Internal faults External faults 




No Yes No 
Malfunction if channel 
noisy? 








Malfunction if channel 
noisy? 
No No No 
 
Event Tree for Directional Comparison Blocking (DCB) 
Figures 21.a to 21.l show the event trees for DCB scheme. Similar to the previous schemes, 
diagrams start with the case of a single relay - single channel and continue with adding 
appropriate redundancies in the scheme. Since the zone 1 element, in this scheme, does not 
play any role in clearing in-section faults, there is no difference between faults occurring 
in overlapping area and end zones. External faults are, however, treated based on their 
location against zone 2; e.g. external faults within the zone 2 reach of either relays are 
suspicious to mal-operation if the corresponding blocking signal is not received. This is 
shown in Figure 21.a by reaching the “MF” (mal-function) mode if the communication 
device or local relay fails in sending the block signal to the remote station. It is useful to 
note that status of the C.B. in the local station doesn’t have any effect on sending the block 
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signal, and therefore it is bypassed in the event tree. If the system is sound, however, over-
trip is avoided and “SB” (success in blocking over-trip) is reached.  
In case an internal fault happens (Figure 21.b), no block signal is transferred and both relays 
are allowed to clear the fault immediately or after a prescribed delay. In this situation, every 
failure of the protection system would lead to the “F” mode irrespective of the channel 
status. 
Figures 21.c and 21.d describe the condition of dual redundant relays and a single channel. 
When an external fault occurs, the local relay should block tripping and if the primary relay 
fails the backup would perform this task. If neither primary nor backup relay manages 
and/or signaling fails, the relay will over-trip (MF).  
Internal faults, however, are successfully cleared only when all protective devices at both 
sides act normally regardless of the communication. 
In Figure 21.e if the first channel fails, the second one is examined at point “y” and if both 
channels fail the system would over-trip. If either channel manages to transmit the blocking 
signal, “SB” would result. Figure 21.f is the same as Figure 21.b, because the channel status 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 21. Event Tree for DCB. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, 


































































































































































































































































Event Tree for Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB) 
The event tree diagrams are shown in Figures 22 to 33. In drawing these diagrams. It is 
assumed that failure of the relay will not affect sending the blocking signal; i.e. blocking 
signal will continue when it should, regardless of the relay status. 
Figure 22 illustrates the behavior of the scheme when an external fault occurs. If the fault 
happens to be in the zone two of relay S, this relay would stop sending block signal to relay 
“R”, but since relay “R” doesn’t see anything in its zone 2 reach it will never operate. 
Therefore, health or failure of relay “R” will not affect the whole performance. Relay “R”, 
however, continues to block relay “S”. 
The scheme could malfunction if the communication fails after the fault inception. This is 
because if the communication fails, block signal is not received at “S” causing AND-2 in 
Figure 17.b to feed an input to OR-2 during a 150ms window. Since relay “S” sees the fault 
in its zone 2, P(R) =1 and thus will operate AND-3 during the time period. If this 150ms is 
sufficient for the protection at “S” to trip, mal-operation will occur.  If not, a lockout signal 
will be generated after 150ms indicating that the channel is faulty and the conventional 














































































































































































































































Figure 22. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), external fault. S: 
Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not 





Internal faults are examined in Figure 23. If the fault occurs in the overlapping area, it is 
cleared by the instantaneous zone 1 elements of both relays, regardless of the 
communication media. 
Fault in the end-zones, say R, is recognized by the instantaneous zone 1 element of relay 
“R” at local station and by zone 2 element of relay “S” at the remote station. Relay “R” 
clears the fault directly and stops the blocking signal to station “S”. At station “S”, loss of 
block signal along with the zone 2 detection signal allows a permissive trip in a 150ms 
window. If relay “S” manages to trip in the 150ms interval, fault is successfully cleared. 
Otherwise, a trip (unblock) signal is required for tripping. In the latter case, if the 
communication is healthy, the trip signal is received at “S” and fault is successfully cleared. 
If communication fails, however, a loss of block and unblock signals at “S” is reported via 
































































































































































































































































































Figure 23. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (MW), internal fault. 
S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not 
required, SD: Protection succeeds after a time delay 
Figures 24 through 27 suggest the same idea as Figures 22 and 23 except for the relay or 
channel redundancy. The communication media is changed in Figures 28 and 29 to fiber 
optic but the basic principle remains the same. 
Figure 32 illustrates the event tree diagram for redundant relays on independent channels 
when an external fault occurs. Similar to Figure 24, relay “R” doesn’t play any role for the 
fault in zone two reach of relay “S”. In this case, if both relays at station “S” work properly, 
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health in any of the channels would successfully block the over-tripping, SB (top path of 
tree). If both channels fail at this stage, loss of the blocking signal and zone 2 detection of 
relay “S” would allow for a 150ms trip window as before. If one of the relays on station 
“S” is faulty, the same scenario repeats with the communication media corresponding to 


























































































































































































































































































Figure 24. Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ single channel (MW), external fault. S: 
Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not 



















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 25. Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ single channel (MW), internal fault.  
S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: 
Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and not 

















































































































































































































































































Figure 26. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay 
phone line), external fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully 
blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: 




































































































































































































































































































































Figure 27. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay 
phone line), internal fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully 
blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: 


































































































































































































Figure 28. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), external 
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, 
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and 























































































































































































































































Figure 29. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (dedicated fiber), internal 
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, 
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and 





























































































































































































































































Figure 30. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), external 
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, 
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and 



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 31. Event tree for DCUB single relay/ single channel (multiplexed fiber), internal 
fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: successfully blocked over-tripping, 
MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not required, FN: Protection not healthy and 

































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 32. Event tree for DCUB redundant relay/ independent channels (MW+ relay to 
relay phone line), external fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: 
successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not 




Figure 33 shows the case of internal faults. The top branch of the tree diagram represents 
the situation where the relays on both channels are sound. In this case, the health of either 
channel could result in the protection system success. 
If only one relay on either channel is healthy, tree reaches point “B” wherein signaling 
cannot be performed although each substation has a healthy relay. In this case, faults within 
the overlapping area could still be successfully cleared by zone 1 elements of healthy 
relays. Faults on end-zones can also be cleared successfully if the tripping takes place in 
the 150ms time interval. Otherwise, loss of both block and trip signals –due to healthy-
faulty status of relays on either channel– results in a delayed tripping.       
On the other hand, if both relays on either channel 1 or channel 2 are healthy, tree reaches 
points “I” or “C”, depending on the healthy relays being on channel 1 or channel 2, 
respectively. In this case, the tree diagram is continued as before with examining only the 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 33. Event tree for DUCB redundant relay/ independent channels (MW+ relay to 
relay phone line), internal fault. S: Protection successful, F: Protection fails, SB: 
successfully blocked over-tripping, MF: Malfunction, SN: Protection healthy but not 




Device Failure Rates and Unavailability  
To perform calculations based on the above event trees, it is required to have the reliability 
data associated with the protection system components. A device failure rate represents the 
average number of failures per unit time. A constant failure rate is normally assumed during 
the useful lifetime period of device. Failure rates can be obtained from theoretical 
calculations or from field experience [76].  
Failure rates are very useful in predicting reliability characteristics, but do not tell the whole 
story about whether a device will be available when called upon to perform. Thus, it is 
required to consider unavailability. Unavailability is the fraction of time a device cannot 
perform its required task. 
Available literature in reliability describes how to calculate unavailability from a failure 






q   
where: 
q   : Unavailability 
  : Constant failure rate 
T   Average down-time per failure 

1
MTTF  is the Mean Time to Failure 
MTBF  is the Mean Time Between Failures  
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Each failure causes downtime T. Therefore the system is unavailable for time T out of total 
time MTBF. The fraction of time the system is not available is therefore 
MTBF
T
 [76] .   
Table 7 shows the reliability data used in this dissertation to perform the analysis [76] .  
Table 7. Reliability Data for Protection Schemes 
Component Unavailability x 106 
Relay hardware 100 
Relay applied properly 100 
Current transformer (per phase) 10 
Voltage transformer (per phase) 10 
Circuit breaker 300 
DC power supply 50 
Leased telephone line 1000 
Analog microwave equipment 200 
Tone equipment 100 
Microwave transmission channel 100 
Fiber optic channel 100 
Multiplexing fiber optic transceiver 100 
Modem 30 





Impact of Protection System Structure and/or redundancies on 
Dependability/Security 
 
The impact of the pilot protection scheme structures, as well as redundancy in various parts 
of the system, on the protection system reliability is quantified in this section.  
To this end, probability of various paths in event tree diagrams are calculated. A path can 
occur, if all the events in that path occur. Considering that all the paths are mutually 
exclusive, the probability of a particular system outcome is calculated by summating the 
probability associated with each path leading to that outcome. The specific outcome could 
be system failure, success, mal-function or any other protection system mode. Clearly, the 
probability of each outcome depends on the paths leading to that outcome and the 
probability associated with events constituting each path.   
Permissive Under-reach Transfer Trip (PUTT) 
The first scheme to be considered is the PUTT scheme introduced in the previous sections. 
The reliability results for this scheme are illustrated in Figure 34. 
Several observations can be made from the results: 
 For a given configuration, the probability of the failure state is greatly affected by 
those events that, when occur, take the system to the failure state, regardless of the 
other events. The larger the number of such events (denoted as failing events), the 
higher the probability of a failure state. It can be observed that the number of failing 
events in the “single relay and single channel” is more than the other five 
configurations and so this configuration has the highest probability of failure, both 
in case of internal and external faults. 
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 Redundancy decreases the number of failing events and as such, configurations (b), 
(c) and (f) are less likely to fail. The number of failing events in (b) are slightly 
more than (c) in external faults resulting in a higher likelihood of failure.  
 In the case of internal faults, the failing events are protection failures not the 
channel failures. Therefore, configurations that are made more robust to the 
protection failures; i.e. (b) and (f), have the lowest failure probability. 
 The probability of state “SD”; i.e. delayed clearance of the internal fault, on the 
other hand, depends on the channel health. If the channel fails, the clearance of 
internal fault would be delayed. Therefore, configurations (c) and (f) with 
redundancy in channel, have less probability for reaching the “SD” mode. 
 Fiber optic channels (d) and (e) have less complexity than microwave channels and 
therefore have better performance in channel-related modes such as “SD”. 
Configuration (d) is even simpler than (e) and has a lower “SD” probability. 
 The results indicate that this is a highly secure scheme as no malfunction occurs in 
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Directional Comparison Blocking Scheme (DCB) 
Reliability diagrams for this scheme are shown in Figure 35. The following points are 
highlighted about this figure: 
 Unlike PUTT, DCB scheme is subject to mal-function (MF) if the channel fails. 
 Schemes with more reliable channels like (c), (d), and (e) are less susceptible to 
malfunction. 
 Configuration (f) has the worst status in terms of mal-function. The reason for this 
is that, any failure of either channel could stop the block signal and result in mal-
function. It should be noted that operation of each relay could open the breaker 
(relay contacts are tied to perform “or” function). It might be favorable to “and” the 
relay contacts to ensure more security in case of external faults, however, it would 
decrease dependability, resulting in more “F” states. 
Directional Comparison Unblocking Scheme (DCUB) 
Figure 36 illustrates the reliability indices for DCUB.  
 In this scheme, “SD” is expected as activation of “lock out” signal will change the 
scheme to a conventional distance framework with associated zone 2 time delay.  
 Mal-function depends on the channel status and configuration with more reliable 
channels like (c), (d), and (e) show a higher tendency towards malfunction. 
 The malfunction is avoided if the fault clearance takes more than 150ms to be 
completed and therefore the scheme has better general performance than DCB in 
terms of mal-function.  
 Unlike the PUTT that always has a delayed response (SD) when the channel fails; 
DCUB has delayed tripping when channel is faulty, only if the protection fails to 
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clear the fault within 150ms window. Hence, DCUB has a better performance 
against delayed tripping. 
 Protection failure in clearing internal faults (F) is related to the protection 
availability. Configurations (b) and (f) with redundant relays are therefore less 
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DCUB Single relay/ Single channel 
(Dedicated Fiber Optic) 1: External fault 


























DCUB Single relay/ Single channel 
(Multiplexed Fiber Optic) 1: External 


























DCUB Redundant relay/ Independent 
Channels (MW+Phone) 1: External fault 











Pilot schemes differ widely in the communication media, and in the logic used for the fault 
detection as well as authentication of the received signal.  
In this chapter, event trees were used to give a quantitative analysis and comparison of pilot 
protection schemes. Even though the unavailability of individual components are 
approximate values, event tree analysis gives useful “order of magnitude” results. These 
results, especially when used in comparison with each other and with a graphical interface, 
illuminate how various system structures and redundancies would affect the performance 
of protection. Some of the results are as follows: 
 Blocking systems tend to be more dependable, while transfer-trip systems are more 
secure.  
 The unblocking system combines the dependability of blocking systems with the 
security of the transfer-trip systems, providing a highly reliable directional pilot 
relaying system for transmission lines.  
 The unblocking scheme shows less tendency to delayed tripping in case of channel 
failures. 
 A large number of components in series results in poor reliability. It can be seen 
that in every scheme, fiber optic channels, and especially dedicated fibers have 
better performance than the others in channel-related failures. This is due to the 
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simplicity of the fiber optics media, due to less series components required for the 
channel success.  
The results and conclusions can assist both utilities and manufacturers in making educated 
and substantiated decisions regarding system design and implementation.    Results of study 
carried out in this chapter will be used in chapter 6 in determining the impact of protection 















CASE STUDIES: APPLICATION OF FAULT CURRENT LIMITERS   
 
Application of FCL in Sporn Substation, West Virginia  
This section is mainly focused on the application of a SFCL based on High Temperature 
Superconductor (HTS) in the American Electric Power (AEP) 138kV transmission grid 
[23]. The particular type of SFCL considered for this application is “Matrix Fault Current 
Limiter” (MFCL) and is presently under development by SuperPower Inc. and Nexans 
Superconductors GmbH [23]. 
Superpower Inc. and Nexans SuperConductors GmbH partnered to develop and 
demonstrate a High Temperature Superconducting (HTS) Fault Current Limiter (FCL) for 
utility transmission voltage level applications. This device employs technology that offers 
modular features that enable the scale-up to transmission voltage levels of 138 kV. In 
conjunction with Nexans’ Melt-Cast Processed (MCP) BSCCO-2212 HTS elements, the 
MFCL provides a solution which is more economical than many conventional solutions to 
breaker over-duty problems [77]. 
Figure 37 shows a substation of the American Electric Power (AEP) grid in West Virginia.  
The high current problem is originated by the auto-transformer 𝑇3, which ties the 345 kV 
portion of the switchyard to the 138 kV portion. This tie is beneficial to the operation of 
the system during normal operation, but the transformer contributes an additional 13 kA at 
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the 138 kV bus during fault conditions. This puts 9 breakers of the substation, as indicted 
in the figure, in an over-duty situation. 
 
Figure 37. Potential MFCL application [23]. 
 
Chapter two gave a good review and comparison of current reduction techniques and 
devices used in different areas and situations based on the operating conditions, and desired 
levels of reliability and security. An effective economical and technical comparison 
between the above alternatives to solve the fault current over-duty problem at transmission 
level is reported in [24]. The comparison shows that SFCL is a cost-effective solution that 
besides a good performance in limiting the fault current at the very first cycle, it also offers 
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the benefit of enhancing the system reliability. A SFCL performs this function by reducing 
the stress on power equipment and preventing unnecessary outages.  
Among solutions given in [24], the substation in Figure 37 currently employs a sequential 
tripping scheme to cope with high fault currents. In order to do this, breakers 𝐸3 and 𝐸, 
which have sufficient rating, are tripped first if a fault is detected on Lines #1 to #4. This 
removes transformer 𝑇3’s contribution to the fault so that the affected over-duty breaker 
can safely open and isolate the fault. This sequential breaker scheme solves the problem, 
but has the disadvantage of delaying the fault clearing by adding 𝐸3 and 𝐸 breakers in the 
trip sequence. It also results in unnecessarily removing the normal  𝑇3 load current to 
portions of the system that were not affected by the fault. 
An alternative solution is to keep  𝑇3 connected during the fault, but limit its current with 
a FCL [78].  American Electric Power (AEP; Columbus, Ohio, U.S.) and a team consisting 
of SuperPower Inc. (Schenectady, New York, U.S.), Nexans SuperConductors GmbH 
(Hürth, Germany) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL; Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 
U.S.) have made it a priority to address fault current over-duty problems at the transmission 
voltage levels of 138-kV and higher [79]. 
Figure 37 shows how the addition of a MFCL in series with transformer 3T could resolve 
the problem without resorting to the sequential breaker trip scheme. This location is also 
in agreement with the results published in [45] that reviews all possible locations for using 
fault current limiter in a substations and recommends that in a 1.5 breaker arrangement, 
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installing FCL’s in series with critical lines would have the highest positive impact on fault 
level reduction.    
Here the MFCL is transparent to the system, and transformer  𝑇3 supplies load current from 
the 345 kV system to the 138 kV system. Under fault conditions, the MFCL transits to the 
high impedance state to limit the contribution of 3T  to the fault, allowing the existing 
breakers to clear the fault without having to open breakers 𝐸3 or 𝐸 first.  
In following sections we deal with this application and, in quantitative terms, address the 
reliability of the above scheme and compare the two cases of using the sequential breaker 
trip scheme and using a FCL. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
Due to switching nature of power substations, we should use special methods that can take 
into account these switching actions and their effects on the system. Because of this reason, 
reliability assessment of substations is usually done using failure modes and effects 
analysis [80]. The basis of this method is to identify whether the failure of a component or 
combination of components causes the failure of the load point of interest. If it does, the 
event is counted as a load point failure event. Otherwise, it is disregarded at least as far as 
the load point of interest is concerned. The consequence of a given failure event is then 
identified according to the severity of the failure.  
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In this method, all events that contribute to unavailability of any given load point are 
recognized and recorded for that load point. Then for the event 𝑖, occurrence rate  𝜆𝑖, outage 
time  𝑟𝑖 , and unavailability 𝑈𝑖 due to that event are calculated.  
Each event i can be either a fault in one component or overlapping outage of two or more 
components. For instance the event where a short circuit happens in breaker 1 and 
transformer 3 is open (due to maintenance).  
Equations 3 to 5 are, respectively, used to calculate the expected failure rate, average 
outage duration and average annual outage time associated with the overlapping outage of 
two components 1 and 2.  
 
                                      (3) 
                                                                                  (4) 
                                                     (5) 
 
Where  𝜆1, 𝑟1, 𝜆2, and 𝑟2 are failure rates and outage times of components 1 and 2, 
respectively.  
As all the events are assumed to be mutually exclusive, they are effectively in series from 
a reliability point of view, meaning that occurrence of one of them would result in 
unavailability of the load. The indices for the studied load point can therefore be evaluated 
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using Equations for series events- equations 6 to 8- in which 𝜆𝑖 and 𝑟𝑖  are, respectively, 
the average failure rate and average outage time associated with the ith event. 

i
s i                                                                                         (6) 

i


















                                                                             (8) 
Where s , sU , and sr  are the load point (or system) average failure rate, average 
unavailability and average outage time, respectively.  
Study Results 
Following are the assumptions that were made in this study. These assumptions are the 
most possible realistic ones, as to the best knowledge of the author. They are not, however, 
restrictive and similar results are obtained when they are altered. 
1- In the absence of two transformers 3T  and 4T , generator 5G  in Figure 37 may not be 
able to supply the full load. In such circumstances (only unit 5G  in service), unit 5G  could 
become unstable depending on conditions such as the unit readiness to supply the loads, 
generating capacity status at the moment, speed of the generator response to the change in 
the load value, protection clearing time, etc. This event is, therefore, designated as 
“potential instability” which implies that it could potentially lead to system instability. 





study  of period in the service"in  5Gonly "  toexposure of No. Total
 service"in  
5
Gonly " when iesinstabilit of No.
InstabP                            (9) 
 
The above probability could easily be obtained using the historical data recorded in 
event/fault recorders in the substation. 
If we define event “A” as “ 5G becomes instable when only G5 remains in the circuit” 
and event “ B ” as the event that “only 5G  remains in the circuit”, possible outcomes of 
event “𝐵” are “𝐴” and “?̅? “ (“?̅? “ being the case that 5G doesn’t becomes instable when 
only G5 remains in the circuit) , therefore the rate of event “𝐴”  is: 
 
instabPBA  )()(                                                                                                          (10) 
 
2- In the conventional sequential scheme, if breakers E or 3E  fail to open to disconnect
3T , some breakers maybe subject to over-duty. These cases are designated as “potential 
C.B. blast” as they may or may not result in a real breaker blast. BlastP  defines this 
probability as: 
 
  shouldthey open when   tofails 3Eor  E that  timesof No. Total




 Frequency of the event “ C ” defined as “A specific breaker blasts when E or 3E  fails to 
open when they should” is then: 
 
BlastPDC  )()(                                                                                                             (12) 
Where “ D ” is the event that E or 3E  fail to open when they should. 
3- Transformer 4T  cannot carry the full load current. Therefore in case that only 4T  
remains in the circuit, all loads are curtailed due to the overload of this transformer. 
4- Transformer 3T can carry the full load current for the duration of the switching time. 
Switching time is the time required to perform the switching action in substation to isolate 
the affected component or to transfer load to the healthy feeders. This time is typically 
selected to be one hour.  
 
5- Combination “G5+One transformer” can carry the full load current without overload 
limitations. 
 
6- Transformers 3T and 4T are capable of carrying the full load current without overload 
limitations. 
Based on the above assumptions, comparative studies were conducted using the above 
method to examine the reliability impact of incorporating the MFCL in the transmission 
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substation. Figure 38 and 39 show the effect of MFCL on the failure rate and unavailability 
of individual load points. In these figures L1 to L4 are lines #1 to #4 and customer plant is 
unit 5G  in Figure 37 [22].   
 






































As expected, it is seen from these figures that using MFCL would decrease the failure rates 
and unavailability. It can be seen from the results that the maximum unavailability 
improvement is achieved for the customer plant with 0.0572 hrs/yr. This is due to the 
adverse effect that sequential trip has on the continuity of service to the customer plant and 
that MFCL prevents the unnecessary outages in this regard. 
Potential instability of the substation without and with MFCL is illustrated in Figure 40. In 
these figures, “O/yr” is short for “occurrence per year” and indicates the rate of the events.  
In this case, MFCL reduces the potential instability from 0.0288 to 4.4466e-7. This is a 
considerable improvement with respect to stability and is mainly because the existing 
sequential scheme jeopardizes system stability by disconnecting the transformer 𝑇4 and as 
such 𝐺5 would have a lesser chance to remain stable. 
 




















Figure 41 compares the bus isolation probability for the two cases of without and with 
MFCL.  
 
Figure 41. Bus isolation without and with MFCL. 
 
 
In some cases, such as when breaker 3E  is faulty, transformer 3T  continues to send current 
to the fault. In these cases if the back-up protection of  3T  does not operate in time to 
disconnect the transformer, the transformer may become damaged. Therefore, these cases 
are designated as “potential 3T  damage”. It is obvious that when MFCL is used, 3T  is 
prevented from getting damaged because of the limited current and so there is no “potential 
3T  damage” in case of MFCL. Figure 42 shows the frequency of these cases without and 
















Figure 42. Potential T3 damage without and with MFCL. 
 
Figure 43 shows the frequency of “Potential Circuit Breaker blast”. It should be noted that 
this event, although not so common, once it occurs it impose a tremendous amount of extra 
cost and outage time on the system.  
 
 




































Another interesting study that can be conducted is to examine the variation in expected 
failure rate due to changes in InstabP  for different load points with and without MFCL.  This 
comparison is shown in Figures 44 through 48.  As expected, failure rate increases as the 
InstabP  increases.  The results also indicate that sensitivity of λ with respect to InstabP  is less 
when using MFCL compared to that of without MFCL. This indicates that when MFCL is 



















































































































Application of FCL in Wind Power Plants 
In the coming years there will be more and more wind power plants connected to the 
electric grid. The integration of wind turbine generators, and large number of induction 
generators in wind power plants dramatically increases the fault current level beyond the 
capacity of existing protection devices [39]. The system stability and voltage quality may 
be corrupted. So the power system switchgear and power system protection should be 
carefully designed to obtain a secure operation of the system. Fault Current Limiters 
(FCL’s) regulate the amount of current moving through the transmission and distribution 
systems under abnormal conditions. In [81], [82], and [83] it is shown that Fault Current 
Limiters (FCL’s) suppress this negative influence of DG on distribution systems. The use 
of superconducting fault current limiter (SFCL) reduces fault current level at the stator side 
and improve the fault ride through capability of the system [40].  In this section, application 
of a type of FCL called Superconductive Shielded Core Reactor (SSCR6) is studied in a 
wind power plant. Computer simulation examines the effectiveness of SSCR in reducing 
the fault current level as well as provision for transient stability without affecting the 
normal operation of the system. 
In following sections of this chapter, we will model a SSCR in Simulink. Since most 
generators used in wind power plants are induction generators, we will then develop a 
                                                 
6 Described in Chapter two 
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model for simulation of induction generator in the Simulink. Using these two models we 
can simulate the performance of SSCR in a given wind power plant. 
 
Simulation of SSCR 
In [51]  a SSCR is developed and tested in the circuit shown in Figure 49. The same circuit 
is used in this paper to simulate the operation of SSCR using a new model and compare it 
with experimental results presented in [51] .  
 
Figure 49. Circuit used in simulation of SSCR [51]. 
 








                                                                                                             (13) 
iRV LL .                                                                                                                            (14) 
Where e is Voltage of the power source, LV  is Voltage across the load LR , SSCRV   is the 
voltage across the SSCR, r is the internal resistance of the source, and i  is the current in 
the circuit. 
Equation (13) could be simulated in SIMULINK using the block diagram of Figure 50 [84]. 
The block "SSCR" in the figure represents the superconductive limiter. Figure 51 shows 
details of the SSCR block. This figure simply denotes the relationship between ISSCR and 
VSSCR; i.e. current through the SSCR and voltage 𝑒 across it, respectively. Despite the 
simplicity of the proposed model, it has sufficient accuracy to predict the behavior of a 
SSCR in limiting short circuit currents. The accuracy of the proposed model is then 




Figure 50. Block diagram used in simulation. 
 
Figure 51. Inside the SSCR block. 
It can be seen from Figure 51 that VSSCR consists of four parameters e1, e2, e3 and e4. e1 
and e4 are voltage drops due to the resistance and leakage reactance of the copper coil of 
SSCR, respectively. These two terms always exist regardless of the mode of operation of 
SSCR. In other words, whether or not the SSCR works in superconductive region, it has 
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the resistive voltage drop and leakage voltage drop associated with the copper coil. 
Therefore e1 and e4 are directly added to give the final voltage drop. The other two voltage 
drops, i.e., e2 and e3 do not exist during the normal operation of SSCR. They appear only 
when the SSCR loses its shielding behavior as the result of a fault condition. e2 denotes 
the voltage drop corresponding to the resistance of the superconductor and e3 is the voltage 
drop across the reactance of the unshielded copper coil. As a matter of fact, the main 
function of SSCR is to expose the inductance of the copper coil when a fault occurs. 
Therefore, e3 is the main component in limiting the fault current. Since e2 and e3 do appear 
only during fault conditions, they are multiplied by a blocking signal prior to summation 
to give the final voltage drop. The blocking signal is multiplied by e2 and e3 and blocks 
them by outputting a zero when the current in the circuit is below the critical level. When 
the current passes this level, i.e. when the fault occurs, the output of this block jumps to 
“1”, hence allowing e2 and e3 to contribute to the final VSSCR. Block “s” in Figure 51 
generates this signal. 
Figure 52 shows the output of block “s”. It is clear that “s” is a simple switch with “0” 
output for currents below the critical current of superconductor and jumps to “1” when the 
current passes the threshold. The reason for using a hysteresis behavior for “s” is that when 
the current passing through the SSCR increases and makes the device to quench, it remains 
quenched and doesn’t return to its superconducting state even if the current falls below the 
critical value. Therefore, once the output of “s” jumps to “1” it must remain at this level 
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and not return to “0” at any time. This irreversible behavior of SSCR is well simulated 
using the hysteresis path shown in Figure 52. 
 
Figure 52. Output of block "s" in Figure 51. 
Actually, in reality, at some time after the fault is detected and cleared, the SSCR returns 
to its superconductive state. Inclusion of this "reset time" is beyond the scope of this study. 
The model of this section simulates the macroscopic behavior of the SSCR for Grid study 
only. It should be noted that in order to simulate the exact behavior of the SSCR during 
quench the step function in the output of the block "s" should be replaced by an exponential 
function to take into account the effects of penetration depth, magnetic and thermal 
diffusion, and a possible transition into the flux flow state during quench. 
Figure 53 shows the experimental and simulation results for the circuit. It can clearly be 




It should be noted that the new model receives the current passing through SSCR as input 










Figure 54. Input-output status of the proposed model for SSCR. 
Simulation of Induction Generator  
Equations of an induction machine in time domain are as below [85] : 
Stator voltage equations.  
𝑣𝑎𝑠 = 𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑟𝑠 +
𝑑𝜆𝑎𝑠
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                              (15) 
𝑣𝑏𝑠 = 𝑖𝑏𝑠𝑟𝑠 +
𝑑𝜆𝑏𝑠
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                              (16) 
𝑣𝑐𝑠 = 𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑠 +
𝑑𝜆𝑐𝑠
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                               (17) 
Rotor voltage equations.   
 𝑣𝑎𝑟 = 𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑟 +
𝑑𝜆𝑎𝑟
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                            (18) 
𝑣𝑏𝑟 = 𝑖𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟 +
𝑑𝜆𝑏𝑟
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                             (19) 
𝑣𝑐𝑟 = 𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟 +
𝑑𝜆𝑐𝑟
𝑑𝑡
                                                                                                              (20) 
Flux linkage equations. 
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𝑎𝑏𝑐]                                                                                            (21) 
Where 
𝜆𝑠
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝜆𝑎𝑠 𝜆𝑏𝑠 𝜆𝑐𝑠]
𝑇                                                                                                (22) 
𝜆𝑟
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝜆𝑎𝑟 𝜆𝑏𝑟 𝜆𝑐𝑟]
𝑇                                                                                               (23) 
𝑖𝑠
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝑖𝑎𝑠 𝑖𝑏𝑠 𝑖𝑐𝑠]
𝑇                                                                                                   (24) 
𝑖𝑟
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [𝑖𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑏𝑟 𝑖𝑐𝑟]
𝑇                                                                                                  (25) 
The submatrices of stator and rotor winding inductances are : 
𝐿𝑠𝑠
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [
𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑠𝑚 𝐿𝑠𝑚
𝐿𝑠𝑚 𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠 𝐿𝑠𝑚
𝐿𝑠𝑚 𝐿𝑠𝑚 𝐿𝑙𝑠 + 𝐿𝑠𝑠
]                                                                      (26) 
𝐿𝑟𝑟
𝑎𝑏𝑐 = [
𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑟𝑚
𝐿𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟 𝐿𝑟𝑚
𝐿𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑟𝑚 𝐿𝑙𝑟 + 𝐿𝑟𝑟


































                             (28) 
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Where 𝜃  is angle of the rotor. Applying park transformation in stationary reference frame 
to the voltage and flux linkage equations will time remove time dependency of the 
equations and result in equations (29) to (35) [85].  Figure 55 schematically shows this 

























































































































































                                      (35) 
Where the primed rotor quantities are their referred values to the stator side, and 
 𝛹( ) = 𝜔𝑏𝜆(  ) in all equations.  
By defining mutual flux linkages as: 
)3(),( 'qrqsmmq iiX                                                                                                            (36) 
and 




the mutual flux linkages of the machine can be expressed as: 
 )5(mqqslsqs iX                                                                                                          (38) 
)6(mddslsds iX                                                                                                           (39) 
)7(''' mqqrlrqr iX                                                                                                           (40) 
)8(''' mddrlrdr iX                                                                                                          (41) 
 









































































                                                                                                  (48) 
 
It is now possible to rearrange the equations of the induction machine into a suitable form 
for simulation. Substituting Equations (42)-(45) into voltage equations (29) to (34) and 




































































































                                                                                        (54) 










                                                                                       (55) 







                                                                                           (56) 
 
In Equation (56), 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ  is the externally applied mechanical torque and 𝑇𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑝 is the 
damping torque in the direction opposite to rotation. The value of 𝑇𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ  is negative for the 
motoring condition, as in the case of a load torque and is positive for the generating 
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condition, as in the case of an applied shaft torque from a prime mover. Equations (49) to 
(56) give a proper simulation model that can be easily implemented in simulation programs 
such as SIMULINK. Block diagrams of simulation of the above equations in SIMULINK 
are given in Figures 56.   
Based on the above discussion, the overall simulation of the induction generator presented 
here receives the terminal voltage of the machine as input and calculates the generator 
current as output. This input output status of the presented model is shown in Figure 57 
(compare it with Figure 54 for SSCR). 
 




(b) d-axis circuit 
 
 
(c) o-axis circuit 
 
 
(d) Developed torque and speed 






Figure 57. Input- output status of the presented induction generator model. 
 
Inclusion of SSCR in Wind Power Plants 
Figure 58 shows a typical wind power plant where an induction generator is used along 




Figure 58. Test system used in the simulation. 
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In order to simulate this system, the network equations should be derived first and used 
with the two models presented above for the SSCR and the generator. Network equations 










i sysSSCRcL                                                                                                        (58) 
 
The block diagram in Figure 59 illustrates the computer simulation flow graph for the 
circuit in Figure 58. In this block diagram the two previously discussed models for SSCR 
and generator are used in addition to the network model Equations (57) and (58). 
 




Using the SSCR and induction generator model in the block diagram of Figure 59, the test 
system was simulated using SIMULINK. Point “F” in Figure 58 was subject to a single-
line-to-ground fault as well as a three phase-to-ground fault and current responses were 
examined in each case. In both cases the faults occur at t=4 sec. Figures 60 (a) and (b) show 
the results for three-phases fault and Figures 60 (c) to (d) and 61 (a) to (d) illustrate the 
results for single-line-to-ground fault. Since the generator is supplied via the infinite bus, 
in the case of the three-phases-to-ground fault at “F”, the main supply to the generator is 
short circuited by the fault and hence removed. In this case, the short circuit current appears 
to decline automatically even without existence of SSCR, however, SSCR serves as a 


















(a)  (b)  
(c)  (d)  







(a)  (b)  
(c)  (d)  
Figure 61. Single-line-to-ground fault (LG) at point F (a) iL, phase c (b)  iG, phase a (c) iG, phase b  (d) iG, phase c . 
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Application of SFCL in Power Substations to Enhance Reliability 
In order to examine the impact of employing SFCL on station reliability, all the 
configuration shown in Figure 8 chapter 2 are used for this analysis.  These arrangements 
are repeated here in Figure 62 for easy reference. As noted earlier, SFCL would prevent 
loads from being curtailed in case of a short circuit in the system.  This implies that some 
of the failure modes of substations which cause interruption of Load points in the absence 
of SFCL, are eliminated when the SFCL is employed.   
 
(a) single sectionalized bus arrangement 
 
























(c) main and transfer bus system 
 
(d) double bus system 
Figure 62. Common configurations in switching substation. 
 
Failure modes and effects has been used to study impact of using SFCL in various 
substation arrangements and locations [14]. Table 1 in Appendix shows that SFCL 
eliminates a large number of failure modes. Since the reliability indices of the entire 
substation are determined through these failure modes, using SFCL improves the reliability 
indices of substations, as it was expected [14]. 
The worth of employing SFCL is examined by comparing the reliability indices for two 
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calculated without installing SFCL.  In the second case, the reliability indices are calculated 
in the presence of SFCL. The reliability data used in these calculations are shown in Table 
8 [22] . 
Table 8.  Station Reliability Data [22] 
element 
 












CB 0.005 0.005 0.01 12 1 
Disconnector 
Switch 
0.005 0.005 0.01 
4 
1 




Table 2 in Appendix shows the study results associated with the station configurations 
"main and transfer bus" shown in Figures 49.c.  All the failure events affecting Load point 
L1 are shown in the tables.  Similar calculations could be conducted for “L2” due to the 
symmetry of the circuits.  Some of the failure events which were previously affecting Load 
point L1 are eliminated by installing the SFCL.  These failure modes have been highlighted 
in the Appendix of this document and summarized in Table 9. The associated events are 
therefore disregarded for the load point of interest.  
In the results presented in this dissertation, overlapping forced outages up to second-order, 
first order active failures and first-order active failures overlapping a stuck breaker are 
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considered [14] . The probability that a breaker fails to open when required (stuck-breaker 
probability) is assumed to be 0.1 for all cases. Moreover, the SFCL is assumed to be fully 
reliable, i.e. failure rate of the SFCL is assumed to be zero. 
 
 
Table 9.  Events Eliminated due to Employing SFCL(s) in main and transfer bus system 
Events 
Events Deleted Due to 
SFCL 1 SFCL 2 SFCL 1&2 
9A X X X 
10A X  X 
11A  X X 
1A+11S  X X 
4A+11S  X X 





Table 10. Reliability indices for bus arrangements without SFCL. 
Bus Arrangement  λ (f/yr) r (hours) U (hours/yr) 
Single Sectionalized 
Bus 
  0.031000622   5.516126591    0.171003356 
Breaker and a half   0.024001495   2.249994085   0.054003221 
Main and Transfer  0.06750085   1.888926615   0.127504153 




Table 11. Reliability indices for bus arrangements with SFCL. 
 Bus Arrangement  λ (f/yr) r (hours) U (hours/yr) 
Single Sectionalized 
Bus 
0.020000622  7.999918952 0.160003356 
Breaker and a half 0.022501356 2.33333045 0.052503098 
Main and Transfer    
SFCL1 0.058000925  2.034521926 0.118004153 
SFCL2 0.05750085  2.043520262 0.117504153 
    SFCL1 & SFCL2 0.05150085 2.16509343 0.111504153 
Double bus 0.025000845  5.399960001 0.135003562 
 
Tables 10 and 11 summarize the results of these calculations.  It can be seen from the results 
shown in these two tables that the most reliability improvement is achieved in case of a 
“double bus system” with a “0.0175 f/yr” decrease in the average failure rate. This, 
however, reaches its minimum variation in “breaker and a half” with a “0.0015 f/yr” 
decrease.  
It can be seen from the results of calculation that using SFCL in each case improves the 
reliability indices. The impacts on the reliability indices vary for different configurations. 
For the single sectionalized bus arrangement, the expected failure rate and the annual 
outage time decreases from 0.3 to 0.20 f/yr and 0.171 to 0.16 hrs/yr, respectively, when 
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SFCL is used.  This improvement, however, is different for the case of breaker and a half 
station configuration.  The reliability improvement in this case is less compared with the 
case of the single sectionalized bus arrangement.  The decrease in the average failure rates 
for these two configurations is in the order of 35.5% and 6.25%, respectively.  The reason 
for this is that one and a half station configuration is inherently more reliable than the single 
sectionalized bus arrangement.   
Comparing the reliability indices for different substation arrangements also shows that 
“breaker and a half” is the most reliable one with a “0.054 hrs/yr” unavailability, while 
“single sectionalized bus arrangement” is the least reliable with a “0.171 hrs/yr” 
unavailability. This information is useful when selecting the substation arrangements 
among available alternatives. 
 
Figure 63. Comparison of failure rates for various arrangements with and without SFCL: 























Figure 63 shows failure rate of load point L1 for the four configurations with and without 
SFCL. Another interesting study that can be conducted is to examine the variation in 
expected failure rate due to changes in stuck-breaker probability for different station 
configurations with and without SFCL.  This comparison is shown in Figure 64. Stuck 
breaker is a situation in which a circuit breaker fails to operate even after receiving a 
tripping signal from a relay or a switch. Stuck breaker can undermine the protection scheme 
and can cause damage to machinery and is a danger to personnel.  Common reasons for a 
circuit breaker not opening are a disconnection in the trip circuit or a mechanical problem 
with the circuit breaker. 
As expected, failure rate increases as the stuck breaker probability increases.  The results 
also indicate that sensitivity of failure rate λ with respect to stuck breaker probability is 
less when using SFCL compared to that without SFCL.  This can clearly be seen as the 
slope of the lines associated with the case with SFCL is less than that of the case without 
SFCL.  This is much more significant for single sectionalized bus arrangement and double 
bus system shown with the horizontal lines.  This indicates that when SFCL is used, station 




Figure 64. Variation of λ with respect to stuck breaker probability : (a) Single 
sectionalized bus arrangement (b) Main and transfer bus system (c) Breaker and a half 

































































































Other Studies on Reliability Improvements by Using Fault Current Limiters 
Literatures on reliability impacts of FCL’s can be divided into two main categories: those 
focusing on proposing models for the FCL as a new element in the power system, and those 
working on modeling the impacts/behaviors of FCl’s in the power grid. Studies in the first 
category are helpful in providing models for the system incorporating the new element, but 
their values are limited by how accessible it is to build up the proposed model in the reality.  
It is especially important to be able to find/calculate the recommended model parameters 
using in-field data and non-destructive tests.   
[86] proposes a Markov model for operation of SFCL shown in Figure 65. This model is 
then used to calculate the reliability indices of a three bus system with the SFCL installed, 
and comperes it with the non-FCL case. [87] and [88] use this model to asses reliability of 




Figure 65. Six-state model of SFCL recommended in [86]. 
Parameters of this model are as below: 
𝜆12:   Failure rate at which resistance zero state can be changed into the quench state in 
normal condition 
𝜆21: Repair rate at which the extra resistance by quench can be changed into zero resistance 
in normal condition  




𝜆31:  Repair rate at which SFCL with zero resistance can be reconnected to network in 
normal condition 
𝜆23:   Failure rate at which SFCL with extra resistance can be separated from network in 
normal condition 
𝜆45:    Failure rate at which perfect operation is interrupted as SFCL partly limits fault 
current in abnormal condition 
𝜆54:     Repair rate at which perfect operation is recovered from partial fault current limit 
in abnormal condition  
𝜆46:    Failure rate at which perfect operation is interrupted as SFCL is separated from 
network in abnormal condition 
𝜆64:    Repair rate at which perfect operation is recovered from disconnection in abnormal 
network 
𝜆56:    Failure rate at which SFCL with extra resistance can be separated from network in 
abnormal condition 
𝜆42:    Failure rate at which SFCL can't recover superconductivity in normal after perfect 
operation in abnormal 
𝜆14, 𝜆25, 𝜆36:   Transition rates from normal condition (I) to abnormal condition (II) 




The illustrated model in Figure 65 is a very detailed model and could be used to give 
accurate results and indices, but it encounters a large number of transition rates and 
parameters that aren’t normally available. Such data would need very detailed information 
and historical data regarding the system under study.  
[10] uses the Markov model of Figure 66 to model the operation of a SFCL. States 1 and 3 
indicate that the SFCL operates perfectly under normal and abnormal conditions, 
respectively, where abnormal conditions mean that a fault has occurred in the network. 
State 2 is determined as the operation of the SFCL that fails under normal conditions. The 
main source of this problem is the cooling devices. State 4 results from the fault of the 
superconductor or module when a fault occurs in the network. The value of  𝜆13 is the 
success rate where the SFCL operates perfectly after detecting a fault. The value of 𝜆14 is 
the failure rate where the SFCL fails to limit fault current in a network, and 𝜆41 is the repair 
rate from State 4 to State 1. The value of 𝜆31 is the repair rate of the network. After a fault 
in the network is cleared, the SFCL in State 3 can be restored to normal State 1. The 
transition rates of 𝜆12 and 𝜆21 are the failure rate caused by the SFCL itself and the repair 
rate of the SFCL itself without any fault in a network, respectively. 
Although this model uses less parameters than the model of Figure 65, it still needs some 
data that are not easy to find/calculate in real system operations. There are also confusions 
regarding definitions of some of the rates; e.g. 𝜆31 is the rate in which SFCL goes from 
state 3 to sate 1; i.e. from limiting state back to the normal state; in other words the recovery 
153 
 
rate of the superconductor. System repair can start during this transition or after, however 
𝜆31 is the SFCL recovery rate and not the system repair rate as shown in [10] .  
 
Figure 66. Four-state reliability model for SFCL. 
Since FCL’s and specially SFCL’s are still in R&D phases and with limited practical 
applications and data available, usage of such detailed models will be less realistic and 
most likely delayed until more data becomes industrially available on operation and 
application of these devices in the future decades .   
As stated earlier, second category of works have tried to address the reliability impact of 
SFCL by modeling the behavior of the device in the system without focusing on the model 
of the SFCL itself. Many studies have been carried out concerning different type of FCL’s 
[4] ; their structural designs [5] , [6]; and their impact on static and dynamic behavior of 
faulted systems [7] and [8] . In [9], no particular substation configuration is assumed, and 
the FCL is located in a distribution network.  
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A big portion of this group of research works have used cut set techniques such as failure 
modes and effects analysis to address the reliability impacts of the FCL devices [36] , [89] 
, [22] and [15].  
Failure modes and effects has a huge advantage in saving the calculation time by just 
inspecting a certain cut-sets/events of the system leading to the desired outcomes, instead 
of looking at all of the events/cases as in other methods such as Markov or event tree/fault 
tree [3]. Also, the input parameters to this method are mostly failure rates and 
switching/repair times that can be readily calculated or estimated with good degree of 
accuracy through practical data available from day to day operation or from devices such 
as event or fault recorders.  However, using this technique in finding reliability of FCL 
devices, only gives us that part of reliability improvements caused by FCL in preventing 
the loads from being curtailed. While this is a good advantage and allows us to calculate 
improvements in indices such as “Expected Energy Not Supplied” (EENS), “Expected 
Load Not Supplied”, (ELNS), Capacity Outage Probability Table [14] , etc., this doesn’t 
give us the whole reliability improvement caused by using FCL’s.  Main reliability 
improvement comes from the main responsibility of FCL which is limiting the fault 
current, and that doesn’t necessarily lead to prevention of load outage. This becomes 
evident by looking at the works that use failure modes and effects analysis to address 
reliability enhancements due to FCL’s, and seeing that using FCL eliminates just a few 
number of cases leading to the load outage [15]. Therefore using failure modes and effects 
analysis would underestimate the reliability enhancement caused by using FCL. In order 
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to fully compute the effects of FCL in improving reliability, there should be a method to 
calculate the effects of fault current levels in the power system reliability. FCL’s limit the 
fault current in the power system and reduce the stress on circuit breakers, protection 
system and all other elements of the system. In order to capture all these effects, there 
should be a model that addresses the direct effects of fault current levels on the 
system/component reliability levels.    
There is a second group of these categories that tries to address the fault limiting behavior 
of FCL’s in the reliability calculations.  In [10] Monte Carlo simulation method has been 
used along with the Markov model of [86]  to find the reduction in stress caused by using 
FCL’s.  [10] first uses Monte Carlo method to apply faults in various locations of the 
system and calculates the fault currents in various components and protection systems. 
Then calculates the failure probability of protection system in clearing the fault, based on 
an assumed failure density function for the protection system. [10] uses the following 
formula to calculate failure probability of the protection system in clearing the faults: 
𝑃(𝐹𝑗) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐼𝑗
𝑖). 𝑃(𝐹𝑗|𝐼𝑗
𝑖)𝑖                                                                                                  (59) 
Where 𝑃(𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is the probability that 𝑖𝑡ℎ level of fault current passes through protection 
device 𝑗, and 𝑃(𝐹𝑗|𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is the conditional probability that the protection device 𝑗 fails, given 
that that 𝑖𝑡ℎ level of fault current passes through it [10]. 𝑃(𝐹𝑗|𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is the conditional failure 
probability density function of the protection system and is very hard to find in practice, 
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and not easy to generalize given the huge variety of protection system types and their 
characteristics. This approach also has the disadvantage of using the Markov model of [86] 
and the associated problems mentioned earlier.  
[90] uses a similar method to calculate stress on circuit breakers and appreciate the role of 
FCL in mitigating these stresses in power system. It uses the function given in Figure 67 
as failure probability of circuit breaker in interrupting a fault current.  Again, finding this 
probability density function is not easy in practice and needs lots of on-field/historical data 
resulting from tests or operations that aren’t normally available.  
 
Figure 67. Failure probability of circuit breaker vs. fault current magnitude. 
Another big disadvantage associated with all these methods is that Monte Carlo method 
(or any other simulation method) need extremely large amount of calculation time that 
usually increases exponentially as the size of the system under study increases.  
In the next chapter, we develop an analytical model that considers the impact of fault 
current levels in the reliability evaluation of power systems, and therefore allows to take 
into consideration the benefits of FCL in reducing fault current levels and hence mitigating 
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the stress on power system components. This way larger benefit of FCL in enhancing the 
reliability will be revealed and calculated: not just its minor role of keeping the loads 
connected, but also its major role of reducing stress and fault-caused damages to the power 
system components and elements and the entire system in general.  
This developed model will be available using normal operational/historical data relating to 
the usual power equipment, and unlike Monte Carlo or other simulation methods it does 














MODELING THE IMPACT OF OVERCURRENT ON  
RELIABILITY AND ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
In this chapter we develop a theory that will help analyze impacts of fault currents on 
reliability and asset management. As noted earlier there are few works done on impacts of 
over-currents on reliability. However, these studies have not gone beyond the conceptual 
phase and no studies have developed the topic to analyze the direct impact of fault currents 
on system reliability. The main focus of the current reliability calculations are solely based 
on statistical values and not electrical parameters. In this context, reliability of an electrical 
power system is evaluated in the same exact way as the reliability of an urban logistics 
system. Reliability indices calculated in such a framework will only reflect the general 
ability of the system to deliver its defined tasks, and will not allow to model the direct 
impact of electrical variables on the system reliability indices. Author sincerely believes 
the work that is reported in this dissertation would be the first that brings the “relationship 
between electrical variables such as current and the reliability indices to a new level.   
Modeling the Effects of Overcurrent on Component Failure Rates  
A huge short circuit current can cause a component to fail by exceeding its strength value 
in a short period of time. A long duration overload condition can also cause the component 
to fail by eventually exceeding the strength of the component as shown later in Figure 71. 
Although short circuits and overloads are two distinct physical phenomena, having 
different causes and effects, their deteriorating effects can both be described using the 
model proposed later in this chapter. As such, henceforth in this document both events are 
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referred to as abnormal or overcurrent. However, when a short circuit is mentioned, a 
higher current in a shorter period of time is meant as opposed to an overload that would be 
a lower current over a longer period of time.   
Overconsumption of electricity by users, especially during peak hours can be another 
reason for having larger than intended currents through conductors that would shorten the 
useful lives of electrical components, by having continuous exposure to higher than 
designed electrical and mechanical stresses. In order to avoid these consequences, utilities 
advise demand response programs for their customers that will incentivize customers for 
reducing their consumption in certain times or through certain patterns. Chapter seven of 
this document will study the impact of these demand response programs on asset 
management, useful lifetime and maintenance planning of electrical components.      
In a power system, over-currents occur at intermittent intervals and the likelihood that an 
exposed component fails increases during the exposure time. In order to model the effect 
of these occurrences, a model similar to the one used for adverse weather conditions can 
be used [14].  
Data on overcurrent (short circuits or overloads) collected from event recorders over a 
period of time would produce a chronological variation as shown in Figure 68.  
If the failure rate of an arbitrary component during normal conditions is  , then during 
abnormal conditions, its failure rate changes to which is clearly greater than  . The 




Figure 68. Chronological diagram of normal and faulty conditions. 
 












                                                                                                        (60) 
Where TnN
i
i /  is the expected duration of normal conditions and TsS
i
i /  is the 
expected duration of abnormal conditions.  
i
n  and 
i
s are as shown in Figure 68. In this way, 




Derivation of the model 
It is clear that as the current through a component increases during the abnormal time 
intervals S , the failure rate of the component, 𝜆, would also increase, 𝜆′, and the component 
will be more likely to fail. In order to model the behavior of a component under abnormal 
conditions, it is helpful to study the strength pattern of the component. Suppose J  is the 
maximum tolerable current that can pass through the component. This J represents the 
strength of the component against over-currents and is therefore designated as the “strength 
current”. If I is the actual flowing overcurrent, the component endures as long as IJ  . 
The strength current J  depends on various factors and it changes over time due to aging. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to consider J  as a random variable and that its average value 
and variance change over time to account for component deterioration. 
There are a number of statistical distribution functions that can be used to model the 
behavior of J  [91]. In this document, a Rayleigh distribution is used to model the strength 
current J  (maximum tolerable current) of the component as shown in Figure 70. This 
current could be broken into its active and reactive elements, each following a normal 
distribution as considered in standard stress and strength literature [91]. As a result, the 
absolute value of J , i.e., the magnitude of the current strength, would follow a Rayleigh 
distribution [91], [3] and [92]. This distribution function has been used in many relevant 
documented studies in the literature and has the advantage of not sliding over into the 








Figure 70. Rayleigh model of strength current. 
 
Let us assume that an overcurrent with a given magnitude of I  occurs at 00 t  and it lasts 
for a duration of t . Component reliability at time t is the probability that the component 















                               (61) 
In (61) k  is the inverse of variance of the strength current and is assumed to be an 
increasing function of time in order to model the deterioration of strength with time. 
Specifically, k  is allowed to vary exponentially with time as in (62) and shown in Figure 
71.   
 
tk









Figure 71. Growth of k with time 
 












                                                                               (63) 
where )(tu  in (63) is the unit step function and is used simply because there are no faults 
when 0t . 
In a more general case, consider a component with a constant failure rate  is exposed to 
an abnormal current at 0tt   and the event lasts for at least t . )(tR  in (63) then implies 
two probabilities: the probability that the component is healthy for 0tt   , and the 
probability that it remains healthy during the abnormal condition. The first probability is 
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te .  and the second one is the time-shift of (63) by 0t . These two probabilities are 
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(66) 





















                               
(67) 
Where )( 0tt   is an impulse function starting at 0t . 






















                                                      (68) 
In (68) the time varying part of failure rate which is caused by the abnormal current is 𝜆′ 
as denoted in Figure 68 and Equation (60). 
Equation (68) shows that the effect of abnormal current I is twofold: a rapid impact in the 
form of the impulse function at the beginning of the fault; and an exponentially increasing 
impact as to the third term of (9). The impulse function simulates the component failure at 
the very beginning of the abnormal current and could be neglected if we discard the initial 
failures.  
Figure 72 shows a conceptual pictorial representation of (68). As seen in this figure, this 
behavior is similar to the simple model of Figure 68 or Figure 69. 
 





Equation (68) shows that failure rate during the abnormal current condition S is 
proportional to the square of the abnormal current I . Therefore in Equation (60), although 
S  is generally of a very short duration compared to N , severe fault currents would highly 
increase the failure rate during fault conditions. This indicates that the contribution of the 
second term in Equation (60) can be considerable.  
Markov Model Considering Overcurrent States 
Here we develop a Markov Model to find various reliability indices of the component 
considering over-currents in the system.  
Figure 73 shows a proposed Markov model for calculating preventive maintenance cycles. 
In this figure F is the component failure state and f is the state where there is an overcurrent 
condition in the system. States 𝐷0  through  𝐷𝐹 are the component normal state and the 
various deterioration levels, respectively. 𝐷𝐹 is when the component stops functioning   as 
a result of continues deterioration, and it should be brought to maintenance. PM, the 
minimal preventive maintenance state, is assumed to bring the component back to the 




Figure 73. Markov Model for preventive maintenance considering system faults. 
 
At state f, the component is exposed to an extra stress resulting from the overcurrent 
condition that has occurred in the system and the failure rate of the component in this period 
is . Once in state f, the component can either fail and enter the failure state F, or its health 
condition further deteriorates and goes down one more level into the next deteriorating 
state (Figure 73). These events are shown with transition rates 𝜆′ and  𝜆𝑓𝐷 , respectively. 
According to [3], transition rates 𝜆′ and  𝜆𝑓𝐷 can be defined as follows: 
 𝜆′ =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓 




𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑓 




Therefore, the probability that the component fails (as opposed to being deteriorated) as 





                                                                                      (69)            
 





Number of component failures as a result of system overcurrent 







fail  can then be plugged into (69) to get the value of fD . 
The following points should be noted in calculating   for the Markov model: 
1- Instantaneous failure of components as a result of abnormal currents are 
disregarded in this analysis. This is mainly because we are interested in the non-
instantaneous impacts of abnormal currents that develop with time. Instantaneous 
failures are the results of an imperfect design, or are due to an improper testing 
procedure, etc. Thus, the impulse term in (68) is omitted here. 
2- The time dependent portion of Equation (68),  , is considered in two ways: using 
an approximate model and an average model.  
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In the approximate model, the value of   during an abnormal current is assumed 
to be constant. This constant value is obtained from (68) by setting 0tt   in the 




𝐼2                                                                                                            (70) 
In the average model, however, the average value of   during a fault is calculated 










𝑒𝑘2(𝑡−𝑡𝑖). 𝐼2𝑑𝑡 = 𝑘1
𝑒𝑘2𝜖−1
2𝜖
. 𝐼2                                                              (71) 
where  
it   is the instant when  abnormal current  occurs 
𝜖   is the duration of the abnormal current   
 1k , 2k     are the strength current constants  
The average value of the failure rate given in (71), is believed to be a reasonable choice 







 shows that two systems with the same value of 
 dtt)(  will have the same reliability values.  
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The difference between the approximate and the average models (i.e., 𝜆𝑖
′  and  𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒,𝑖
′ ) 
increases with length of interval 𝜖𝑖 of the abnormal current as shown later in the current 
document. 
The average outage duration r  for the Markov model shown in Figure 73 is calculated 
using (72). In (72), the numerator is the cumulative probability of failure and the 
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In this equation, variables used are as below: 
𝑃𝑀𝑖: Probability of residing in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ preventive maintenance state 
𝑃𝐹: Probability of the component failure state  
𝑃𝐷𝐹: Probability of state 𝐷𝐹 
𝜇𝑃: Repair rate from preventive maintenance states 
𝜇: Repair rate from state 𝐷𝐹 
Study Results Using the Markov Model 
In what follows, various simulation case studies are conducted using the proposed Markov 
model to examine the variation of component outage duration r  with respect to various 
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abnormal current parameters. First, the overload impacts are studied followed by that of 
short circuits. 
As an example, assume that the average failure rate of a component is 01.0 f/yr and its 
repair lasts for 12.5 hours. Furthermore, assume that accelerated lifetime tests have shown 
that 4.01 k  in the strength current model of the component.  The value of 2k  and other 
parameters are specified for each of the simulation case studies as discussed below. 
Variation of outage time with overloads. 
In this and the next simulation study, state 𝑓 of the Markov model is considered to be an 
overload condition. In addition to the above parameter values, other parameter values used 
in this study are: 
 
08.02 k  
1f    (occ/yr) ,  
200   (occ/yr)   
Varying the overload duration from 100 msec to 20 days, the average outage duration r  is 
calculated and the results are shown in Figure 74. In this study, the approximate value of 
failure rate   during the overload condition is calculated using Equation (70). The study 
is repeated for three different values of the overload current I; i.e., 1.5, 1.7, and 2 p.u.  It 
can be seen from the results in Figure 74 that the average outage duration r  increases as 
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the duration of overload increases. The curve starts from an outage duration of 12.514 
hours when no overload occurs. It can be seen from the results that both magnitude and 
duration of the overload current have considerable effects on the component outage time. 
 
 
Figure 74. Variation of outage duration with duration of the overload current values of 
Case1: 1.5 p.u., Case2: 1.7 p.u., and Case3: 2 p.u.. 
Variation of outage time with strength deterioration. 
As shown in Figure 71, 2k  is a parameter of the strength current model that defines the 
time constant of the component strength deterioration. A large value of 2k indicates that 
the component strength deteriorates rapidly and the component is more likely to fail due to 
over-currents. Simulation studies were conducted with both average and approximate 
models of   given by (70) and (71). The results are presented in Figure 75 for different 
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values of 2k . In these studies, the overload current is set at 1.5 p.u. Other parameters have 
similar values as those in the previous study. 
 
Figure 75. Variation of outage duration versus duration of the overload current for the 





It can be seen from Figure 75 that for a given value of 2k , the difference between the two 
models increases with the overload duration. This is clearly shown in Figure 76 where the 
plots of differences of the two models versus the overload duration are shown. 
 
Figure 76. : Differences between two models of Figure 75 versus the overload duration. 
 
These results make sense because when the overload duration is long, the increase in 
over time would be considerable (Figure 72). This means that it is not justified to consider 
  as a constant during the whole duration of the overload condition. It is also seen that 
the difference between the two models increases when 2k increases. This is because larger 
values of 2k  indicate that the system is strongly time dependent and hence assuming a 
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constant value for   is actually inaccurate. Furthermore, it could easily be shown that if 
2k  or 𝜖 (duration of the overload) in (71) is sufficiently small, then using a Taylor series 
















. 𝐼2                                                     (73) 
This shows that the approximate and the average models of   are almost identical. 
The differences, however, are negligible in practice and therefore the approximate model 
serves well, particularly in case of over-currents that have short durations. If a high 
accuracy is required, on the other hand, an accurate time model should be used for long 
overload durations. 
Variation of outage duration with short circuit rate. 
In this study and the next one, state 𝑓 of the Markov model is now considered to be the 
short circuit state instead of the overload state as in the above studies and that it lasts for 
100 msec. Other parameters used in this study are as follows: 
22 k  
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2fI   p.u. 
200   (occ/yr)  
The rate of the short circuit state f, f , is varied from 1 to 7 “occ/yr” and the impact on 
outage duration r  is studied. The results are shown in Figure 77.  For this study, the 
approximate model of   in (70) is used for simplicity. It can be seen from Figure 77 that 
rate of the short circuit has little effect on the outage duration.  
 
 
Figure 77. Variation of outage time versus short circuit rate. 
 
 
Figure 78 shows the component outage time versus the component maintenance rate for 
various short circuit levels. It can be seen from Figure 78 that if repair is performed more 
frequently, then the outage time will be reduced. This reduction is mainly affected by the 
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maintenance frequency and the short circuit level doesn’t play a significant role at the 
beginning. But as the short circuit level increases higher than a critical value, the 
maintenance program should be updated to adjust for the short circuit effects. For high 
short circuit levels, a scheduled maintenance would result in lower-than-expected outage 
reductions and thus the schedule must be updated accordingly. 
 
 
Figure 78. Variation of outage time with maintenance rate for short circuit levels of 




Preventive maintenance scheduling  
Existing methods of maintenance scheduling can be classified into several categories. First 
group includes those based on heuristic methods, which provide the most primitive solution 
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using trial-and-error principles [93]  [94]  [95]. Second category is based on artificial 
intelligence (AI) methods [96] [97] [98] which include expert systems, simulated 
annealing, fuzzy theory, genetic algorithms, and various other combinations of AI methods. 
AI techniques have the capability of dealing with multi-objective requirements. However, 
the expert systems approach is difficult to generalize since an inference engine must be 
designed according to the particular characteristics of a designated problem. None of these 
methods can be generalized to give an applicable general practice, due to large number of 
parameters and variables required, and the fact that large portion of the techniques are 
configured according to the specific requirements of the specific designated power system  
[99]. Another major problem with all of these techniques is that they deal with maintenance 
of electrical components as a general engineering challenge and none of them treat it in the 
context of electrical parameters such as overcurrent levels. Although there is a general 
agreement that mathematical models provide more reliable and versatile solutions to 
maintenance scheduling, to the best of authors’ knowledge there is no analytical methods 
that address the impact of overcurrent on reliability functions and therefore on maintenance 
scheduling [100]. 
Equation (68) gives an expression for the failure rate and Figure 72 shows the failure rate 




Figure 79. Plot of 𝜆(𝑡) versus time for an abnormal current situation starting at 𝑡0 
The average failure rate can be calculated by integrating this curve over a time period as 
















𝑑𝑡                                            (74) 
Since the second term exists only around  𝑡0 and the third term exists within the fault 
period; i.e. 𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖 (Consider T = 1) 



































)                                                                                                                                 (75) 
Therefore: 




)                                                                                                           (76) 
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(76) shows that impact of  a single overcurrent is an increase in the average value of the 





For several overcurrent faults with values of  𝐼1, 𝐼2, …, 𝐼𝑛 occurring at times 𝑡01, 𝑡02, 





















) , 𝑡02 < 𝑡 < 𝑡03
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𝑖=1        , 𝑡0𝑛 < 𝑡 
                                                    (77) 
 
Figure 80 shows the average failure rate in the presence of several overcurrent events 
occurring in the system based on (77).  
 
Figure 80. Average failure rate versus overcurrent events. 
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With the average failure rate as shown in Figure 80, we can calculate the reliability function 
for different time sections of the curve as follows.  
For  𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖 (during fault), using 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒
−∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0   and Equation (68) for 𝜆(𝑡), 
we can write: 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡








𝑢(𝑡 − 𝑡0)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
}               (78) 
Since the second term exists only around  𝑡0 and the third term exists between 𝑡0 and 𝑡: 





























𝐼2𝑢(𝑡 − 𝑡0)]                                                                                                             
(79) 
Which is the same as Equation (65). 
For the period after fault; i.e.  𝑡0 + 𝜖  < 𝑡   using  𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒
−∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0  and Equation (68) for 
𝜆(𝑡) , we have: 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑒−∫ 𝜆(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑡








𝑢(𝑡 − 𝑡0)] 𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
}               (79) 
Since the second term exists only around  𝑡0 and the third term exists between 𝑡0 and 𝑡0 +
𝜖 (as seen in Figure 79) 
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𝐼2𝑢(𝑡−𝑡0)         𝑡0 < 𝑡 < 𝑡0 + 𝜖 




𝐼2                           𝑡0 + 𝜖 < 𝑡                
                                             (81) 
Figure 81 shows the reliability 𝑅(𝑡) of a component with two overcurrent events at t=1 and 
t=2 based on equation (81).  Both Figures 80 and 81 illustrate how failure rate and system 
reliability are influenced by occurrences of faults and can be used to develop schedules for 
preventive maintenance. 
 
Figure 81. Reliability in the presence of two overcurrent events. 
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Figure 82 assumes that preventive maintenance is done at interval  𝑇 on the component 
shown in Figure 80.  As seen from Figure 82, preventive maintenance is assumed to bring 
the component back to the as-good-as new state. Maintenance interval 𝑇 can be determined 
based on the maximum allowable value of the failure rate or the desired targeted value of 
reliability [101].  Knowing the average values and the number of overcurrent events in a 
system throughout the year, one can point out the approximate curve for 𝜆𝑎𝑣𝑒  using (77) 
and then preventive maintenance can be scheduled based on the targeted value of reliability 
or failure rate to bring the components back to their as-good-as new states in intervals 𝑇  
[102] and [103]. 
 
 





CHAPTER VI: IMPACT OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS AND FAULT 
CURRENT LIMITERS ON ASSET MANAGEMENT  
In this chapter, we study the impact of protection devices and fault current limiters (FCL’s) 
on asset management in a substation in the North American electric network that has 
installed a superconducting fault current limiter (SFCL). The SFCL installed in this 
substation is a matrix fault current limiter (MFCL) type, described in Chapter 2. This 
application was studied in detail in Chapter 4 where impacts of installed MFCL in 
preventing load point outages were calculated and analyzed. As noted earlier, positive 
impacts of FCL devices is not limited to outage prevention. In this chapter we use our 
developed model to address the more important role of FCL’s in limiting the fault current, 
and quantifying their impact on valuable assets in electric networks. For the sake of 
comparison, we study the impact of the installed MFCL on asset management in the 
presence of several different protection schemes, and compare it with the case without 
MFCL and other types of superconducting/non-superconducting FCL’s.  
Figure 83 shows a on-line diagram of a real substation in the US with SFCL installed. As 
noted in Chapter 4, the installation of SFCL is intended to minimize the contribution of 
transformer 𝑇3 to the fault current. This was due to the fact that the extra fault duty from 
transformer 𝑇3 would put some of the breakers in a situation of not being able to break the 
current safely. Installment of the MFCL in series with transformer 𝑇3, as shown 
numerically prevents a portion of load point outages, and reduces the potential of unstable 
system operations.  Fault current limitation, on the other hand, will reduce the stress on the 
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power system elements in fault instances, therefore preventing their exposure to future 
faults which would manifest themselves in their failure rates being inhibited from 
increasing. We will here deal with this aspect of the FCL, and quantify the impact of this 
device on failure rates of the substation elements.   
 
 
Figure 83. Electric Substation in the USA with SFCL installed [24]. 
 
Calculating the Impact of Protection Devices and FCL on Failure Rates 
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In order to perform the calculations, two possibilities have been considered for the fault in 
the substation:  
F1 : short circuit in the secondary side of the transformer 𝑇3. This could be anywhere in 
the bus bar, circuit breakers, or outgoing lines. The main current passing through 
transformer 𝑇3 in this case is the transformer short circuit current which is determined from 
the transformer per-unit linkage impedance [104].  
F2: This shows a fault in the primary circuit of transformer 𝑇3. In case of a short circuit in 
primary side of transformer𝑇3 , the transformer does not have a major contribution to the 
fault. The major contributions to the fault current come from other sources such as 
transformer  𝑇4 , other substations, and the generating unit 𝐺5  . Calculating the short circuit 
current for this type of faults, is harder than previous case due to lack of exact data about 
specifications of transformer 𝑇4 and unit 𝐺5. However, the probability of this type of fault 
is much smaller than the first type since substations are normally considered as protected 
areas and are much less likely to be faulty compared to case F1 that can present any fault 
on any of the transmission lines. To calculate the fault current in this case, typical per unit 
values were assumed for transformer 𝑇4 and unit 𝐺5. Considering that similar machines 
usually have parameters with same typical per-unit values, this assumption will generate 




In general, if a fault occurs at locations 𝐴𝑖 in the system, and the fault current that passes 
through device 𝑗 in this case is  𝐼𝑖
𝑗










                                                                                                               (82) 
∈𝑖 is the duration of the fault current 𝐼𝑖
𝑗
, and can be calculated from the fault clearance time 
of the protection system. 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are strength parameters of the component 𝑗 in the power 
system.  
If the rate of fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 can be shown with 𝜆𝐴𝑖 , the average increase in failure rate of 
the component 𝑗 over time interval 𝑇 , ∆𝜆𝑇
𝑗
  can be calculated as follows: 
∆𝜆𝑇
𝑗
= ∑ 𝜆𝐴𝑖 . 𝑇.𝑖 ∆𝜆𝑖
𝑗






                                                                      (83) 
There are various elements and causes resulting in a fault in a given zone;  for example for 
the fault F1 in above the reasons could be faults in any of the circuit breakers, faults in any 
of the lines, a fault in the secondary winding of transformer 𝑇3 etc. If we assume these 
faults are independent of each other, the failure rate  𝜆𝐴𝑖 can be expressed as follows: 
𝜆𝐴𝑖 = ∑ 𝜆𝐴𝑖,𝑘𝑘                                                                                                                               (84) 












                                                                                       (85) 
With the FCL installed in the system, fault current form the fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 will change to 
𝐼𝑖,𝐹𝐶𝐿
𝑗
. Therefore the average increase in the failure rate of component 𝑗 in the presence of 
FCL (over time interval 𝑇) will be: 
∆𝜆𝑇,𝐹𝐶𝐿
𝑗






                                                                                       (86) 
In order to calculate ∈𝑖 or the fault duration in zone 𝐴𝑖 , we need to use results from security 
analysis of protection systems in the previous chapters. It is assumed that a protection 
system will be in one of the following modes at any given time [69]:  
S   Protection succeeds to clear the internal fault (instantaneous) 
F   Protection fails to clear the internal fault (protection not healthy while needed 
to operate) 
SB  Protection operates correctly to block the over-tripping during an external 
fault. (Does not work when it is not required) 
MF  Protection malfunctions (protection operated incorrectly) 
SN  Protection is healthy but not required to operate 
FN  Protection is not healthy while not required to operate 
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SD  Protection succeeds to clear the fault but after a time delay (clearing is not 
instantaneous) 
If a fault occurs within zones of protection, protection system can only be in one of the 
states: 𝑆, 𝐹 or 𝑆𝐷.  𝑇𝑆   , 𝑇𝐹 , and  𝑇𝑆𝐷  are the clearing times associated with these states, 
respectively. 𝑇𝑆 is the clearance time when the protection system can successfully clear the 
fault with no delay. 𝑇𝐹 is the clearance time when protection system completely fails to 
clear the fault in the determined time frame, and therefore encounter the much bigger delay 
of the back-up protection system Finally. Finally, 𝑇𝑆𝐷 is the clearance time of the protection 
system when protection system fails to clear the fault instantly and there is a time delay of 
zone two involved.  𝑇𝐹 is a much longer time period compared to the other two and can 
cause instability and potential cascading failures. Therefore it is not normally desired for 
protection systems to be in state 𝐹.The expected clearing time for the protection system 
would be: 
∈𝑖= 𝑃𝑖(𝑆). 𝑇𝑆 + 𝑃𝑖(𝐹). 𝑇𝐹 + 𝑃𝑖(𝑆𝐷). 𝑇𝑆𝐷                                                                            (87)  
Where 𝑃𝑖(𝑆), 𝑃𝑖(𝐹), and 𝑃𝑖(𝑆𝐷) are probabilities of the protection system residing in 
corresponding states for a fault in zone 𝐴𝑖 .  We assume that the substation shown in Figure 
83 is equipped with pilot protection scheme (described in Chapter 3) for protection of the 
incoming/outgoing lines. Therefore, we use the results of the calculation performed in 
Chapter 3 to find probabilities of the protection system residing in each of the above states. 
In order to be able to compare the effects of adding redundancy to specific parts of the pilot 
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protection system, as well as using different media for communication, the following 
configurations have been considered and studied for each pilot scheme: 
 Single relay/ Single Microwave (MW) channel 
 Single relay/ Redundant channel (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
 Single relay/ Single channel (dedicated fiber optic) 
 Single relay/ Single channel (multiplexed fiber optic) 
 Redundant relay/ Single channel (MW) 
 Redundant Relay/ Independent channels (MW+ relay to relay on phone line) 
Figure 84 shows the increase in failure rate of transformer 𝑇3 without and with various type 
FCL’s in 50 years (which is average life time of a power transformer [105] ) in the presence 
of various arrangements of the PUTT protection scheme. Model parameters for a power 
transformer have been selected to fit the failure data over a 50 year lifetime of power 





Figure 84. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for PUTT Scheme 
arrangements: 
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW) 
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW) 
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone) 
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic) 
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber) 
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone) 
 
As seen in this figure, without FCL, there will be a huge increase in failure rate of the 
transformer. As matter of fact, without the FCL in the arrangement, the failure rate of the 
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To see the difference in various arrangements of the PUTT scheme better, Figure 85 shows 




Figure 85. Increase in failure rate without FCL for various PUTT Scheme arrangements. 
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Figure 86. Increase in failure rate in presence of resistive SFCL for various PUTT 
Scheme arrangements. 
Figure 87 shows the increment in failure rate for various types of FCL’s and the single 
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Figure 87. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for PUTT single 
relay/single channel arrangements.. 
 
Figure 88 shows change in the average failure rate of transformer 𝑇3 during a one year 
period, without FCL and in the presence of various types of FCL’s. As seen in this figure, 
as FCL is being employed and the fault current limiting ratio increases, the role of 
protection system and the fault clearance time type on increased failure rate becomes less 
and less of an issue. This is clearly seen in the figure by comparing the slope of the line 
from top to bottom for the case of without FCL with various FCL cases. This suggests 
another added value for using FCL’s in the power network, in that it will eliminate the need 
for accurate selection and setting of the protection system by making the entire system less 
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Figure 88. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with 
different types of FCL. 
 
Figure 89 illustrates the increase in failure rate of the transformer, with different types of 
























Figure 89. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for DCB Scheme 
arrangements: 
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)    
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW) 
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone) 
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic) 
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber) 
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone) 
 
Figures 90 and 91 show the increase in failure rate without FCL and with the resistive 































Figure 90. Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCB Scheme arrangements. 
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Figure 92 compares the increment in failure rate for the single relay/single channel 
arrangement of the DCB scheme, without FCL and in case of various types of FCL’s.  
 
Figure 92. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCB single 
relay/single channel arrangements. 
 
From above figures, it is seen that for the DCB scheme there is generally a greater increase 
in the failure rate values, but as before the role of FCL types and limitation ratio on limiting 
the failure rate is incredible.  
Figure 93 shows the sensitivity of failure rate for various combinations of the DCB system 
arrangements and three types of FCL’s. This figure, again, confirms the positive impact of 
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Figure 93. Increase in failure rate for three type SFCL’s and various arrangements of the 
DCB scheme: 
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)    
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW) 
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone) 
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic) 
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber) 
6: Redundant Relay/ Independent Channels (MW+Phone) 
  
Finally, Figure 94 shows the growth in the total failure rate of the transformer 𝑇3 for various 
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Figure 94. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with 
different types of FCL. 
 
Figures 95 to 99 show the failure rate profiles for the DCUB scheme. These figures again 
demonstrate the positive impact of FCL devices in limiting the failure rate values and also 
























Figure 95. Increase in failure rate in presence of several FCL’s for DCUB Scheme 
arrangements: 
1: Single Relay/Single Channel (MW)    
2: Redundant Relay/Single Channel (MW) 
3: Single Relay/Redundant Channel (MW+Phone) 
4: Single Relay/Single Channel (Dedicated Fiber Optic) 
5: Single Relay/Single Channel (Multiplexed Fiber) 

































Figure 96.  Increase in failure rate without FCL for various DCUB Scheme arrangements. 
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Figure 98. Increase in failure rate in presence of various type SFCL’s for DCUB single 
relay/single channel arrangements. 
 
Figure 99. Profile of failure rate of the transformer in one year without FCL and with 
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IMPACT OF DEMAND REPONSE PROGRAMS ON ASSET  
Overloads in the forms of over-consumption, especially during peak hours, happen 
frequently in power systems and will pose an extra burden on the power system equipment. 
Demand response (DR) programs temporarily shifts customer energy load during peak 
demand hours to off-peak periods, thus alleviating the load burden on the power grid during 
high demand times. Reducing the peak energy demand not only allows more electricity to 
be produced by cheaper base load generation but also saves the cost of building additional 
power plants to meet the critical peak demand. Utility DR programs will also extend the 
useful lifetime of power system assets by preventing them from carrying extra loads and 
currents.  In this chapter, in order to study the effects of DR programs on utility asset 
management, at first DR programs are modelled and their impact on load pattern are 
studied. Then, using the developed model in previous chapters, the impact of DR programs, 
in terms of reducing the overload levels, on utility asset management plans is studied.  
Introduction  
The ongoing increases in the consumer demand profiles is stressing the aged electrical 
network as governed by the increase in the System Average Interruption Duration Index 
(SAIDI) and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). The increase in the 
values of these indices is a result of the growing power complications like blackouts, 
voltage sags and overloads which considerably lower the power quality and reliability. In 
order to keep up with the increasing power demand, there is a need to supply electricity 
more efficiently and reliably. Reducing losses through the generation, transmission and 
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distribution networks and increasing the transmission capacity will certainly increase the 
throughput of the current power system, minimizes or eliminates the requirement to build 
new power plants and will give way to better and cleaner means to generate & transmit 
electrical power. Reference [106] shows that creating more efficient end-use and reducing 
consumption will cut generation capital investment by 28% to 35%.  
Demand Side Management (DSM), also known as Energy Demand Management or Load 
Management, entails utility actions that influence the patterns of use of energy consumed 
by end users, such as actions targeting reduction of demand during peak periods or when 
energy-supply systems are constrained. The relatively low utilization of generation and 
networks means that there is a significant scope for DSM in contributing to increasing the 
efficiency of the system investment. Several potential applications of DSM are [107]:  
-Reducing the generation margin 
-Improving transmission grid investment and operation efficiency 
-Improving distribution network investment 
-Managing demand–supply balance in systems with intermittent renewables 
The term DSM encompasses several energy demand modification activities such as [108]: 
Energy Efficiency 
Energy Conservation: involves using less energy  
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Demand response (DR): not necessarily reduction in usage but more likely shifting usage 
to off-peak hours (and also Load building [109]). 
Demand Response 
Demand response is defined as: Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their 
normal consumption patterns in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, 
or to incentive payments designed to induce lower electricity use at time of high wholesale 
market prices or when system reliability is jeopardized [110]. In brief, DR is the change in 
electricity consumption triggered by some utility actions in order to gain specific results. 
Some benefits of DR programs include reduction of power overloads, bill savings for 
customers, lower electricity wholesale market prices and reliability improvements in 
electrical network ( [111] , [112] , [107] , [113] and [109] ). Utilities are using various 
techniques to determine if consumers follow more intelligent energy consumption patterns. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) report entitled “Assessment of DR 
and Advanced Metering” has found that only five percent of customers are on some form 
of DR programs [114]. This is mainly due to the lack of proper models in this area that 
could enable customers and utilities to unveil the strong potentials of these programs.  
Experience indicates that DR programs are more effective when system wise indices and 
parameters are involved and if no contradictory results appear. This is the case of DR 
initiatives with the only aim of securing the system stability, which promotes load shifting 
to periods of time when electricity tariffs are lower. However due to the lack of reliability 
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targets and incentives, average energy consumption on yearly basis may increase due to 
inefficient usage promoted by low rates during off-peak hours, that would in turn 
deteriorate system reliability indices and margins [21].  
There is a lack of an accurate model in the DR area that allows utilities to observe the 
impact of various DR programs on system indices. Some literatures have made good 
attempts in classifying DR programs and modeling each type, but they have assumed a 
constant elasticity that can be inaccurate in predicting customer behaviors in reality [20].    
In this chapter a new DR model is developed used that is completely consistent with the 
demand-price curve and does not have the inaccuracies of the constant-elasticity model. 
Using the new DR model, a control panel is developed that enables utilities to monitor and 
simulate various DR programs in their service areas and view the results on the screen. It 
also allows changing load combinations on various load buses and at different time of the 
year to simulate the realistic situation of the system. Results would then allow for a proper 
planning and utilization of available DR resources in a system based on system reliability 
needs.  
Having the system load profile in the presence of various DR programs, new levels of 
system overloads can be calculated and used in the proposed mathematical model to 




Demand Response Programs  
Demand response programs are divided into two basic categories namely Time-Based Rate 
Programs (TBRPs), and Incentive Based Programs (IBPs) [115]. Figure 100 shows this 
classification. 
 
Figure 100. Classification of DR programs. 
 
In time-based rate programs, i.e., Time of Use (TOU), Real Time Pricing (RTP), and 
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) programs, the electricity price changes for different periods 
according to the electricity supply cost. TOU rates establish two or more daily periods that 
reflect hours when the system load is higher (peak) or lower (off-peak), and charge a higher 
rate during peak hours. RTP rates vary continuously during the day reflecting the wholesale 
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price of electricity. CPP is an overlay on either TOU or flat pricing. CPP uses real-time 
prices at times of extreme system peaks. 
Incentive-based programs include Direct Load Control (DLC), Emergency Demand 
Response Program (EDRP), Capacity Market Program (CAP), Interruptible/Curtailable 
(I/C) service, Demand Bidding (DB), and Ancillary Service (A/S) program. These 
programs can be classified into three main subgroups namely; voluntary, mandatory and 
market clearing programs. 
DLC and EDRP are voluntary programs which mean that if customers do not curtail 
consumption, they are not penalized but they might lose some of the credits that they could 
gain by fully participating in the program. DLC refers to a program in which a utility or 
system operator remotely shuts down or cycles a customer’s electrical equipment on short 
notice to address a system or local reliability issue. EDRP provides incentive payments to 
customers for reducing their loads during reliability triggered events, but curtailment is 
voluntary. 
I/C and CAP are mandatory programs and participating customers are subject to penalties 
if they do not curtail consumption when directed. Customers on I/C service rates receive a 
rate discount or bill credit in exchange for agreeing to reduce load during system 
contingencies. If customers do not curtail, they can be penalized. In CAP, customers 
commit to provide pre-specified load reductions during system contingencies, and are 
subject to penalties if they do not curtail consumption when directed.  
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DB and A/S are market clearing programs, where large customers are encouraged to offer 
or to provide load reductions at a price at which they are willing to be curtailed, or to 
identify how much load they would be willing to curtail at posted prices. DB program 
encourages large customers to offer load reductions at a price at which they are willing to 
be curtailed, or to identify how much load they would be willing to curtail at posted prices. 
A/S program allows customers to bid load curtailments in ISO markets as operating 
reserves. If their bids are accepted, they are paid the market price for committing to be on 
standby. If their load curtailments are needed, they are called by ISO, and may be paid the 
spot market electricity price. More detailed explanations of various DR programs can be 
found in [115]. 
Available DR Models 
References [116] and [117] have studied the impact of several DSM (demand side 
management) programs such as: peak clipping, load shifting and load addition on load 
curve and reliability indices. The studied DSM programs encounter an addition or 
subtraction of specific percentages of annual peak load to the base load. While this 
representation of DSM is helpful for giving an estimation of the impact of DSM on power 
system indices, it doesn’t give a realistic picture of the DSM programs because these 
programs are usually known in terms of pricing and incentives rather than power 
percentages. Moreover, these programs normally do not result in the addition or subtraction 
of an exact power value to the load curve.  
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At this point, it is helpful to review the important concept of price elasticity of demand in 
the Demand Response terminology before presenting the new DR model. 
Price Elasticity of Electrical Demand 
 
Price elasticity of electrical demand is defined as the ratio of relative change in demand to 











                                                                                                                             (88) 
Where E is the price elasticity, Δd and Up are change in consumption and change in 
electricity price, respectively and d0 and p0 are base consumtion and base electricity price, 
respectively.  
According to Eq.(88), the so called “cross-elasticity” of the ith period versus jth period can 
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Now if  ( )d i  1,....24i   is the change in demand in the ith hour and ( )p i  1,....24i   is 
the change in price in the ith  hour and ,i jE is cross elasticity values, for the complete price-
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where 












                                                                                                                                                          (92) 
Models Using Elasticity of Demand 
A model has been presented and studied in [119] for TOU and EDRP programs that is close 
to what happens in reality. However, this model doesn’t consider the diversity of 
customers. For example residential customers may have different reactions and preferences 
to prices and incentives. For a comprehensive study of DR, the intended model should 
consider the diversity and preferences of costumers and should respond differently when 
the combination percentage of costumers in an area changes. 
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References [20] and [120] have provided a good classification and modeling of various 
types of DR, but they have assumed a constant elasticity; i.e., linear  𝑓𝑖  functions. This 
might be helpful in simplifying the problem and giving general results but is not acceptable 
for accurate studies. Another problem with the linear demand-price model is that when the 
price approaches zero, it reaches a steady value and does not grow unlimitedly. Whilst in 
reality, if the price of a commodity drops to zero, its demand will grow in a free market. 
[121] has modified the constant-elasticity assumption by considering an elasticity that is 
constant but that also changes depending on the spot price being considered. This approach 
needs elasticity values to be recalculated for every change in the price and still has the 
deficiency of considering a linear demand function in the first place. 
New DR Model 
[122] has assumed another shape for the demand function, if ,  a trans-log function which 
is more consistent with the real demand curve. This model doesn’t assume a simple linear 
form for the if  function like before, and is widely considered in the economical modelling 
of electricity demand ( [123], [124], [125], [126]). The model also considers other 
parameters such as customer’s income and the price of natural gas in the formulation of 
demand-price function. Equation (93) describes this model: 






D  is the electricity consumption 
Y  is the customer income 
EP  is the electricity price 
GP  is the price of a substitute good, that in this case is natural gas [127], [128], [129].  
The above model is more consistent with demand-price behavior-especially in areas where 
price goes towards zero- than the constant-elasticity model reported in the literature [20].  
In this chapter this model has been adopted as a base in modeling the DR programs. In 
using Equation (93) for this chapter, all parameters other than electricity price could be 
assumed equal to their predetermined values, and hence demand would change only by 
change in the electricity price. Values of the parameters used in this model are given in the 
literature ( [123], [124], [125], [127]) for various countries including the US.  
Modeling Demand Response including Penalties and Incentives 
Suppose that the customer changes his demand from 0 ( )d i  (initial value) to ( )d i (where i  
could be the ith hour or ith period depending on the DR program type), based on the value 
which is considered for the incentive and the penalty mentioned in the contract. The change 
in demand is: 
0( ) ( ) ( )d i d i d i                                                                                                                               (94) 
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If $ ( )A i  is paid as incentive to the customer for each kWh load reduction, the total 
incentive for participating in the program will be as follows: 
0( ( )) ( ).[ ( ) ( )]P d i A i d i d i                                                                                                              (95) 
If the costumer doesn’t curtail or reduce its consumption as to the contract, it will be faced 
with a penalty. If the agreed upon level of the contract is ( )IC i  and the penalty is $ ( )pen i
, then the total penalty, ( ( ))PEN d i  can be calculated as: 
0( ( )) ( ).{ ( ) [ ( ) ( )]}PEN d i pen i IC i d i d i                                                                                      (96) 
It is obvious that for DR programs without penalty, the value of the penalty function would 
be set to zero. 
Let’s assume that ( ( ))B d i  is the customer income of using ( )d i  kWh electrical energy in 
the considered period. The function that is most often used for this purpose is the quadratic 
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Where 𝜌 is the electricity price and the subscription “0”  denotes values before applying 
the DR program. The total benefit, S , of the customer in this interval would be : 
( ( )) ( ). ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ))S B d i d i i P d i PEN d i     
                                                                             (98) 
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It is assumed that customer tends to optimize its benefit. By differentiating the above 
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The above Equation gives the demand value in any interval, based on the features of a 
given DR program, such as price, incentives and penalty values. 
In Equation (99), it can be seen that if the electricity price does not change and the incentive 
and the penalty are zero, then ( )d i will remain the same as the initial value of 0 ( )d i . 
By extending the above concept to calculating the consumption in an interval when the 
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Representation of the load at each load bus. 
The IEEE-Reliability Test System (IEEE-RTS) has been used extensively to develop and 
illustrate composite system evaluations [131]. The load model information provided can 
be used to calculate total system hourly loads for one complete year on a per unit basis, 
expressed in a chronological fashion so that daily, weekly and seasonal patterns can be 
developed. The system load is described by specifying the weekly peak loads in percent of 
the annual peak load, the daily peak load in percent of the weekly peak load and the hourly 
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peak load in percent of the daily peak load. A problem with this approach is that it doesn’t 
consider that individual buses follow different load curves depending on the mix of 
customers at that bus. A more comprehensive load model would recognize that individual 
load buses have different load curves with respect to combination of customer classes at 
that load bus.  
The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) has been used to identify seven types of 
customer sectors [132].These sectors are as follows: 
 





 Government & Institutions, 
 Office & Buildings 
 
The assumed load profiles of these seven customer sectors for a typical day are shown in 













Figure 103. Load profile for the Government & Institution and Office & Building Sectors.. 
Reference [130] shows a method to calculate and illustrate chronological load curves of a 
given bus depending on its combination of these seven sectors. In this method, load curve 
of each sector is determined and combined to give the overall bus load curve. If 𝐿𝑗𝑖  is the 
proportion of the sector peak load contributed by sector i during hour j, to the load at bus 
k, the load at bus k, for hour j is given by Equation (101).    
 
Load at Bus k for hour j=∑ (𝐿𝑗𝑖 × 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑗
′𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑎𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑠 𝑘)𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐵𝑢𝑠 𝑘𝑖=1   (101) 
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𝐿𝑗𝑖 is also referred to as the allocation factor. Tables 12 to 14 in Appendix of this document 
gives the allocation factor of each sector depending on weak of the year, day of the week, 
and time of the day. 
DR Control Panel 
To implement and test the developed model, the RBTS test system has been selected 
because of its simplicity and its selection of parameters and values that can represent 
various possible scenarios in a power system [134] , [135].  
A single line diagram of the RBTS test system which shows the assigned load bus customer 
compositions is shown in Figure 91. It can be seen from this figure that there are some 
residential and commercial sector customers at every load bus. As an example, Bus 2 has 
industrial, commercial, residential, and government and institutional users allotted to it. 








Using the approach outlined in previous section, load profiles have been developed for the 
buses of the RBTS for all hours of the day, all days of the week and all weeks of the year. 
The profiles are also calculated for every possible combination of the 7 major sectors of a 
load: residential, commercial, office and buildings, governmental and institutions, 
industrial, agricultural and large users. Table 12 shows the RBTS bus combinations (MW) 
for each of the load sectors [130] . 
Table 12.   RBTS Bus Load Combinations (MW) 
User Sector Bus2 Bus3 Bus4 Bus5 Bus6 
Large Users --- 55.5 -- -- -- 
Industrial 3.5 3.05 16.3 -- 3.05 
Commercial 3.75 4.7 4.7 3.7 1.7 
Agricultural -- -- -- -- 7.4 




5.55 -- -- 5.55 -- 
Office and 
Building 
-- 1.85 -- 1.85 -- 
 
DR programs are modeled using Equation (100) and the elasticity model of Equation (90). 
These models were integrated into the developed control panel shown in Figure 105. This 
panel would allow the utilities to forecast consumption based on the time of the year and 






Figure 105. DR control panel showing loads on RBTS buses. 
Table 13 shows various scenarios used to obtain the study results. In this table values of 
incentives and penalties are stated in cents/kWh. The load curve is divided into three 
different periods, namely low load period (00:00 am–9:00 am), off-peak period (9:00 am– 





Table 13.  Scenarios Used for Comparison  
No. Scenario Color 
1 Initial Load Blue 
2 
Incentive 5 , penalty 5 
Red 
3 
Incentive 5 ,  penalty 7 
Cyan 
4 
Incentive 10 , penalty 5 
Green 
 










Figure 107. Load profile on Bus 3. Colors codes as defined in Table 13. 
 




Figure 109. Load profile on Bus 5. Colors codes as defined in Table 13 
It is seen in the figures that buses 2 and 5 which are more of residential nature are very 
sensitive to incentive and penalty values. Improper selection of these values might result 
in new peaks being created during the off-peak hours. Large loads (Bus 3), however, show 
a more robust pattern and more advanced programs and studies should be in place to 
effectively impress their patterns of consumption in a short run. This would highlight the 
important role that customer types play in determining their response to the DR programs 
and implies the need for models that tend to consider customer types when evaluating the 
demand response characteristics.  
Reliability Impacts of DR Programs 
Using generated plots for each DR program, overloads in each bus were calculated. For 
calculating the overload current from the consumption data given, electrical and statistical 
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data given in Appendix of this document were used. It is assumed that overload percentage 
on any single equipment at each bus is proportional to the total overload percentage on that 
bus [136]. Based on the values of overload currents and associated time durations, failure 
rate increases can be calculated for each case. Figure 110 below shows the failure rate 
increase over time period of 50 years for various DR programs applied to the test system. 
 
Figure 110. Failure rate increase of transformer 𝑇3 over time period of 50 years for 








































CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE WORK  
In this dissertation a new model was proposed and developed to study the impact of 
overcurrent levels in power system reliability. This model will enable us to consider the 
impact of various types of fault current limiting devices (FCL’s) from an angle that hasn’t 
been seen or discussed before. Using the proposed model, impact of various types of FCL’s 
and protection systems on failure rates were studied and compared. Current limiting 
devices are mainly used to reduce short circuit stresses on components and the proposed 
model allows to quantify this impact. These types of studies would assist utilities in their 
long term plantings and asset management programs. Overload currents and utility 
programs for reducing their impact, known as Demand Response (DR) programs, were also 
modeled using this approach. Since overloads have less a sever role in causing power 
system outages, their reliability impacts have been neglected in conventional outage-based 
models reported in the literatures.  
The author believes that continuation of line of study presented in this dissertation would 
lead to new era of reliability evaluation of power systems using electrical parameters. 
Novel reliability methods that use electrical parameters of the system, as opposed to the 
merely statistical approaches, not only will give quicker and more accurate results, but will 
enable analysis and decision making routines that commensurate with available electrical 
parameters and measures of the electrical network. Some of the possibilities to continue 
this work further are include but not limited to: 
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1- Find parameters of the failure rate model presented in this dissertation from stress-
strength and accelerated lifetime tests on any given equipment. The obtained 
parameters can then be used to accurately model and schedule preventive 
maintenance for that equipment. 
2- Incorporate the electrical models of failure rates in various aspects of reliability 
evaluations and compare the results with those from traditional models.  
3- Perform security and dependability analysis for more types of protection systems 
and compare their effects on failure rates based on their fault clearance times. 
4- Find maintenance intervals for power system components based on magnitude and 
duration of fault currents in that area. Fault current magnitudes and durations can 
be found from historical data obtained from fault recorders in substations, or 
calculated from short circuit analysis. Dependability/security analysis is also 
required to find fault clearance times by the protection systems.  
5- Use the model developed for failure rate in this dissertation to model other 
reliability indices for a component such as MTTR, MTTF, unavailability, etc.  
6- Study other methods of fault current reduction presented in chapter two and model 
them using the developed approach. Pros and Cons of each method can be 
calculated and compared and most efficient method introduced for each application.  
7- In this dissertation, effects of fault currents as the dominant cause of components 
failure, were modelled on reliability. Models can be developed to consider and 
include other electrical parameters such as over-voltages. Although historically 
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over-voltages are having a less important role in component deterioration -
especially in modern power systems with high standard on system grounding-, they 
are still posing threats to insulations and material strengths causing undesired 
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Table1. Eliminated failure modes for Single Sectionalized bus arrangement
 
* Active Failure in component No.1: Short circuit in breaker No. 1 
** Active failure in component No.13 and total failure in component No.1: Short circuit in component No. 13 and any failure (short 
circuit or open circuit) in components No.1. 
“S” is “stuck breaker” and denotes the event that a breaker doesn’t open when required. 
 




Table3. Eliminated failure modes for Breaker and a Half 
 
Table 4. Failure modes of main and transfer bus system 
Failure Event λ (f/yr) r (hours) U (hours/yr)   
8 0.01 1 0.01 
 
5+6 2.28311E-08 0.5 1.14155E-08 
7+10 2.73973E-07 6 1.64384E-06 
7+11 2.73973E-07 6 1.64384E-06 
7+12 1.82648E-07 3 5.47945E-07 
13 0.01 4 0.04 
14 0.01 4 0.04 
3A 0.005 1 0.005 
5A 0.005 1 0.005 
6A 0.005 1 0.005 
7A 0.005 1 0.005 
9A 0.005 1 0.005 
10A 0.005 1 0.005 
11A 0.005 1 0.005 
4A+7 7.42009E-08 3 2.22603E-07 
1A+6 1.14155E-08 0.8 9.13242E-09 






1A+11S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
2A+6S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
4A+9S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
4A+11S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
4A+10S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
TOTAL 0.0675008 1.88893 0.127504153 
Total with FCL1 0.0580009 2.03452 0.118004153 
Total with FCL2 0.0575008 2.04352 0.117504153 
Total with FCL1 
& FCL2  
0.0515008 2.16509 0.111504153 
FCl1   
 
FCL2   
 
Table 5.  Failure Modes of Single Sectionalized Bus Arrangement 
quipment 
Failure Rate (f/yr) 
Repair Time (hrs) Switching Time(hrs) Pc Open 
Circuit 
Short Circuit Total 
Power Transformer 0.015 0.02 0.035 55 1   
Circuit Breaker 0.005 0.005 0.01 12 1 0.1 
Disconnector Switch 0.005 0.005 0.01 4 1  
Bus Bar 0.005 0.005 0.01 4 1  
Failure Event λ (f/yr) r (hours) U (hours/yr)   
5 0.01 12 0.12 
  
3 0.01 4 0.04 
1+2 2.73973E-07 6 1.64384E-06 
1+4 2.73973E-07 6 1.64384E-06 
1A 0.005 1 0.005 
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4A 0.005 1 0.005 
6A+1 7.42009E-08 0.923076923 6.84932E-08 
2A+4S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
6A+4S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
Total 0.031000622 5.516126591 0.171003356 
Total with FCL 0.020000622 7.999918952 0.160003356 
Δ I  0.011  Δ I 0.011   
Table 6:Failure Modes of Breaker and a Half System 
Equipment 
Failure Rate (f/yr) 














55 1   





0.005 0.005 0.01 4 1  
Bus Bar 0.005 0.005 0.01 4 1  
Failure Event λ (f/yr) r (hours) U (hours/yr)   

















 8+6 2.73973E-07 6 1.64384E-06 
10+6 1.82648E-07 3 5.47945E-07 
1+2 9.13242E-08 2 1.82648E-07 
6+9 2.73973E-07 6  
6+7 2.73973E-07 6  
6A 0.005 1 0.005 
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6A+2 2.85388E-08 0.8 2.28311E-08 
6A+6aS 0.0005 1 0.0005 
8A 0.005 1 0.005 
1A+8 9.13242E-08 3 2.73973E-07 
1A+10 4.56621E-08 2 9.13242E-08 
1A+9 9.13242E-08 3 2.73973E-07 
1A+7 9.13242E-08 3 2.73973E-07 
2A+6 9.13242E-08 3 2.73973E-07 
3A+2 2.85388E-08 0.8 2.28311E-08 
3A+8 7.42009E-08 0.923076923 6.84932E-08 
3A+10 2.85388E-08 0.8 2.28311E-08 
3A+7 7.42009E-08 0.923076923 6.84932E-08 
3A+9 7.42009E-08 0.923076923 6.84932E-08 
4A+1 2.85388E-08 0.8 2.28311E-08 
4A+6 7.42009E-08 0.923076923 6.84932E-08 
7A+1 2.85388E-08 0.8 2.28311E-08 
12A+6 9.13242E-08 3 2.73973E-07 
1A+6S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
3A+6S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
3A+4S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
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4A+3S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
9A+8S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
10A+8S 0.0005 1 0.0005 
Total 0.023502038 2.276578078 0.053504224 
Total with FCL1 0.018502066 2.621558372 0.048504247 
Δ I  0.004999971   0.004999977 
Total with FCL2 0.022502038 2.333309743 0.052504224 
Δ I  0.001    0.001 
Total with 
FCL1&2 
0.017502066 2.714207912 0.047504247 
Δ I  0.005999971    0.005999977 
  Eliminated due to FCL1           
    When FCL1 is installed           
    Eliminated due to FCL2           
 
Table 7: Electrical data of Sporn Substation 
 





Loads Unit #5 
400 MVA, 345 𝑌 
kV/138 ∆ kV 
6200 
MVA 
50 MW 350 MW, 
Load factor 
96% 






Table 8. Modes of operation for Sporn Substation 





1 Normal Operation:  Normal carrying 
light load with 
assistance from 𝑇4 
and Unit #5 
400 Arms  Unit #5 Generator 
in service,  𝑇3 and 
𝑇4 each carry light 
load 
2 Unit #5 Generator out of 
service 
Share load with 𝑇4 1250 Arms   𝑇3 and 𝑇4 share 
load 
3 Unit #5 Generator is 




provide all load 
Up to 2300Arms 
(if T4 fails)  
 
4 Fault between FCL and 𝑇3 Close fault in 
Secondary of 
Transformer 
26kArms  E/E3 Breakers 
open and lock-out 
5 Fault in 138kV system Fault in Secondary 
of Transformer 
13.8kArams  Re-close scheme 
employed –up to 4 
re-close with 






































Table 13: Daily percentage of the sector peak load 
 
Table 14: Daily percentage of the sector peak load 
 
